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Introduction
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a coordinated effort of research institutes from
many countries across the world. Its annually repeated surveys are designed to cover various topics
of high relevance to social science research. Very often however, the topics of ISSP surveys –
so-called modules – are of immediate political or social relevance beyond the borders of the scien-
tific community. The “ISSP Data Report”, therefore, addresses not only a scientific audience; it po-
tentially also reaches out to a wider public.
This first issue of the ISSP Data Report presents results from a module series under the title of “Role
of Government”. This topic broadly refers to the mutual relationship of governments and their citi-
zens. More specifically, the ISSP being a survey programme collecting data on opinions and atti-
tudes, the Role of Government modules collect data on the rights and responsibilities of govern-
ments in the perception of their citizens. Role of Government has been the topic of choice for the
very first implementation of the ISSP in 1985, then administered in only six countries, but has been
repeated since in 1990, 1996, and 2006, with a continuously growing list of countries participating
in each module (for a comprehensive overview of ISSP member countries and module participation
see Appendix A.VII. The full list of topical modules is given in Appendix A.VI.).
We have selected seven topics from the scope offered in the four modules. Six of these have been
covered at two or more points in time, allowing us to look at changes, perhaps even trends. The sev-
enth has been newly introduced with the 2006 module. The list of topics also provides the structure
for the ISSP Data Report.
The first topic is that of civil liberties: how far are citizens allowed to go when expressing their polit-
ical opinions, or to what degree are the state and its government entitled to restrict their citizens’
rights of expression and action? This topic has its roots in the 1970s and 1980s, when a number of
Western nations experienced mass protests of the peace and ecological movements, but also some
violence by a radical left. Public attitudes on civil liberties might well have changed since, with the
same questions now being answered under a very different perspective. In particular in 2006, all
discussion of powers for security and legal authorities could have become implicitly linked to fight-
ing the new forms of international terrorism. But there is also a very different aspect to the topic of
civil liberties: the more recent modules also include countries that do not yet have a long history of
democratic regime. Their respondents can be expected to bring in a very different set of experiences
and views.
The following four chapters deal with perhaps more benign, but no less elementary, issues: those of
the provision of social welfare, of state interventions in the economy, of spending priorities for cer-
tain government activities, and of the interaction of taxation and the redistribution of wealth. All
these topics are interlinked by the classical ideological conflict between proponents of a strong, ‘car-
ing’ state with ‘big government’ on the one hand and those who stress the virtues of free markets
and prefer a ‘lean government’ on the other hand. Here, too, one might expect change to be induced
by secular events – in this case, it is the largely unexpected demise of state socialism that started in
the late 1980s and led to the rapid collapse of most socialist regimes of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ in the
1990s. The breakdown of welfare capitalism’s foremost ideological competitor may well have
changed the views that citizens of Western countries have of their own economic systems. But the
ISSP has also many member countries from the former Eastern Bloc, so that we are able to look at
how the attitudes of their populations have adapted to the new circumstances. Again, the diversity
of conditions found in our data is greatly increased in the more recent ISSP modules, which also in-
cludes countries whose economies have only partly crossed the threshold to industrialisation.
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After looking extensively at what respondents expect of their governments, we return to individual
activities of the citizens. The sixth chapter describes to what degree citizens are motivated to con-
tribute to the functioning of the political system, and which chances of success they expect when
trying to influence political decisions making. Obviously, results on this will be most interesting in
regard to the younger and sometimes less stable democracies. But also between well-established de-
mocracies, there are vast differences in the incentives they provide for forms of political participa-
tion such as the simple act of voting.
The seventh and final chapter deviates from the pattern of all the preceding ones, in that it can pres-
ent data only from a single point in time. The topic of corruption was surveyed in the 2006 module
for the first time. Our perspective is focused here on comparing aggregate results across countries,
with the worldwide composition of the ISSP membership in 2006 granting considerable variation of
the results. We also use the opportunity to compare the assessment of national corruption levels as
derived from the ISSP data with another source of such assessments.
Some remarks on the scope and intent of this book are in order at this point. While we have followed
full scientific standards in the preparation of our data, this report is not meant to be a contribution
to scientific research. Its foremost purpose is to present the data as such, in a simple descriptive way.
We have however chosen to do this embedded into frameworks for interpretation that have some
reputation among social scientists, or sometimes just accompanied by loosely collected ideas, to
help with an initial understanding. Even readers without a social science background should often
notice that there are other ways to think about the data presented, and scientifically educated read-
ers certainly will. For both groups of readers, it should be clear that even when we offer speculative
hypotheses or indicative conclusions, we do not purport to actually test, in a methodologically
sound way, any of those hypotheses or conclusions. To keep the description accessible for a broader
target group, we have intentionally abstained from deep theoretical and elaborate statistical analy-
ses.
In addition to the modest analytical scope of this report, there are other factors that may limit the
range of conclusions that can be drawn from our data sources.
The first of these concerns the fact that the samples of respondents drawn within each country may
be very heterogeneous internally – respondents from the same country of course will often be very
different from each other, with respect to their attitudes and other characteristics. We are partly ne-
glecting this fact when we are describing attitudes in each country with just a single number, such
as the percentage of respondents having chosen specific response categories. In keeping with our
general approach, we have abstained from using more complex statistical methods that would be re-
quired to check for the importance of such within-country heterogeneity. We are however rather
confident that the simple interpretations which we offer would rarely be affected by such problems.
A second remark must address the very nature of the data that the ISSP, as a survey of the percep-
tions, opinions, and attitudes of its respondents, is able to provide. Responses to survey questions
can hardly ever be understood to be objective reflections of the reality that the respondents experi-
ence. Even if we do not ask for the respondents’ evaluations or opinions but for factual information,
there is always a subjective component to such responses. A large part of this subjectivity is intro-
duced by the fact that respondents have no choice but to understand the questions they are being
asked within their own personal mindset. Obviously, the extent and content of the information
which respondents bring into interpreting and understanding a given question may be vastly differ-
ent between respondents. Sometimes this can be regarded to be just a random ‘disturbance’ of a hy-
pothetical true response; if some respondents err in one direction, others will err in the opposite di-
rection. But when looking at respondents from different countries, as we will be doing in this report,
it is not unlikely that the cultural context of each country will produce a mindset specific for that
country, whereas respondents from another country will have a systematically different specific
type of subjectivity. This may introduce an unknown bias to comparisons of responses from differ-
ent countries. Researchers of course have tried to minimize this risk when developing the questions
for the ISSP surveys, but it can never be completely excluded. We will hint at this possibility at some
occasions, but could not systematically investigate how much it affects the comparisons we make
between countries.
Finally, we turn to some more technical aspects that will be of interest mostly to readers who have
some background in social science research, and who may want to perform analyses of their own
with the datasets that have been used for this report.
A first piece of technical information is that all results reported here use the weights provided in the
datasets. This is necessary because the weights for some countries contain corrections for
oversampling or design effects.
For all of the analyses that compare points in time, a cumulated dataset was used (its identification
number at the GESIS Data Archive is ZA4747). This dataset joins the individual datasets of the ISSP
modules of 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006, and allows for very convenient comparisons across these
four modules. It contains only those country samples, and only those variables of the original
datasets, that occur in at least two of the four individual modules and which could be sufficiently
harmonised to make valid comparisons. Thus, it collects data from up to 22 different countries.
1
The
list of variables can be found in Appendix A.II, the guidelines followed in cumulating the four mod-
ules are given in Appendix A.III.
The system followed over the series of all ISSP modules is that at least two thirds of the questions are
repeated from the previous instance of the same topical module, while the remaining questions may
be changed. Such changes can either be methodological adjustments, or they can address entirely
new topical areas under the Role of Government heading. For 2006, new areas included were the
fight against terrorism, the perceived performance of governments, and the perception of corrup-
tion. The full dataset of ISSP 2006 (ZA4700) has also been used in different chapters, reporting re-
sults from all 33 countries surveyed in this module.
Access to and methodological information on all the data used here is available free of charge
through the website of GESIS, at http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/. The on-
line portal of the GESIS Data Archive, ZACAT, allows for online inspection and download of the
data, at http://zacat.gesis.org/. More information on using ZACAT can be found in Appendix A.V.
Further material of interest, including a comprehensive bibliography of research work using ISSP
data, can of course be found on the official website of the ISSP, at http://www.issp.org/.
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1 Each of the ISSP modules of 1996 and 2006 already contains a higher number of countries than the cumu-
lated file, which however were not all included in the cumulation because they did not occur in both mod-
ules.
Germany is counted as one country, although we usually distinguish separate samples for East- and West
Germany in the Data Report. The same applies for Israel, where the sample distinction is for regions pre-
dominantly populated by Jews or by Arabs.
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Over the four years the Role of Government surveys have been conducted, the following countries
participated:
1985 1990 1996 2006
Australia X X X X
Canada X X
Czech
Republic
X X
Germany X X X X
France X X
Great Britain X X X X
Hungary X X X
Ireland X X X
Israel X X X
Italy X X X
Japan X X
Latvia X X
New Zealand X X
Norway X X X
Philippines X X
Poland X X
Russia X X
Slovenia X X
Spain X X
Sweden X X
Switzerland X X
USA X X X X
1 Civil Liberties
One of the topics all Role of Government modules are dealing with is every state’s dilemma of guar-
anteeing civil liberties without putting public or even national security at risk, especially in situa-
tions of war and national crisis. In recent years, threats to national security have become more asso-
ciated with acts of terrorism under the auspices of Islamist radicalism, while they formerly were un-
derstood to refer more to leftist political motives, ethnical or separatist conflicts, or just criminal
motives.
In this chapter we want to examine whether a global change in attitudes towards civil liberties over
time can be observed. Between 1996 and 2006 some devastating attacks on the national security of
Western countries have happened. The first and probably most incisive incidents are the plane
hijackings and their disastrous consequences of September 11
th
2001 in the USA. But also the train
bombings in Madrid on March 11
th
2004, as well as the subway train bombings in London on July
7
th
2005 fall in this period. In Germany, train bombings failed only by coincidence on June 31
st
2006.
2
It can be assumed that these terrorist acts have increased the desire for national security not
only in the countries directly affected, but, albeit to a lesser degree, throughout many parts of the
world. In the wake of this change, one might further expect that attitudes towards civil liberties shift
towards more restrictive and conservative points of view. Data from four ISSP modules - three col-
lected before and one after the terrorist attacks - give us an opportunity to compare the levels of
support of civil liberties over time and across countries. Not only would we expect that the men-
tioned political attitudes change over time, we also have to keep in mind that such attitudes will
usually differ widely across cultural contexts, with each country’s distance from the Western world
and its threats, and last but not least with very specific political factors of a given country.
On the purpose of this examination, we are going to take a close look at two ISSP items addressing
the respondents’ sympathy for civil liberties. One item deals with the conflict of state protection
against wrongful conviction bearing the risk of letting guilty persons go free. The second item we
want to look at asks for the respondents’ judgement of the claims of the conscience against the law.
For both items we have trend data that enables us to look for a shift in attitudes. As a second step we
are going to look at how respondents’ perceptions of their governments’ success in dealing with
threats to national security relate to their attitudes towards civil liberties.
The first item we want to look at, asks whether respondents think it is worse to convict an innocent
person or to let a guilty person go free. This question addresses the widespread principle that a per-
son should be regarded as innocent as long as his/her guilt is not proven. The more protection
against wrongful conviction is established in law, the greater the risk that some of the guilty might
be acquitted. People who support civil liberties should rather be willing to take the risk of letting a
guilty person go free than to accept the conviction of an innocent person. However, a guilty person
going free might become a risk for security.
2 This last event can only have an impact on part of the data, since in June 2006 some countries had already
finished their fieldwork. In Germany, the module was in the field at that point of time. For detailed infor-
mation on the fieldwork dates of all ISSP countries for “Role of Government 2006” see list in Appendix A.I.
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The question in all four modules was formulated as follows:
All systems of justice make mistakes, but which do you think is worse...? (ZA4747: V23)
 To convict an innocent person
 To let a guilty person go free
 Can’t choose
The data show that in almost all participating countries and over all module years, the majority of
respondents is of the opinion that it is worse to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty per-
son go free. The only exceptions are Hungary in 1990 and the relatively small sample of the Arab
population of Israel in 1996, where the data show higher agreement with the conservative point of
view. However, in both countries respondents show much more libertarian attitudes in the following
years. In Hungary the very conservative outcomes of 1990 could be observed directly after the end
of the socialist regime in the country. New democratic values of the developing democracy might
have improved the public consciousness of civil rights here. Remarkably libertarian attitudes can be
found in the Scandinavian countries, most notably Norway. This country presents constantly over
80% of respondents in 1990, 1996 and 2006 preferring to take the risk of letting a guilty person go
free rather than to accept the conviction of an innocent person.
Although the chart reveals some small changes of attitudes over the years, in the 20 countries we
have trend data for, there is no general pattern of attitude shift. In keeping with our assumptions,
only Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and Spain show increasingly conservative attitudes
between 1996 and 2006. However, those countries that present data over all the module years from
1985 towards 2006 show a general trend towards more conservative attitudes over all these years,
not only between 1996 and 2006.
Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and the small sample of the Arab population of Israel, on the
contrary, show substantially more liberal attitudes in 2006 than in 1996. Even the USA show in-
creasingly liberal attitudes in 2006 compared to the decades before. In the other countries the out-
comes stay rather constant over these years. So, on the basis of this single item, the conception that
the terrorist acts of the last years have caused a change towards more conservative attitudes within
societies could not yet be underpinned.
3 The percentages do not sum up to 100%, because respondents who answered “can’t choose“ and those who
did not answer at all are left out in this and all the following graphs.
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Figure 1.1 Respondents who think it is worse to convict an innocent person vs. letting a guilty per-
son go free (in %)
4
4 The percentages do not sum up to 100%, because respondents who answered “can’t choose“ and those who
did not answer at all are left out in this and all the following graphs.
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The next item does not focus directly on classic civil liberties in terms of civil rights. It is a rather ab-
stract question on people’s principles - whether they think people should always obey the law or
should follow their own conscience in certain situations. This item addresses the dilemma of indi-
viduality vs. civil obedience. Always obeying the law, even if one’s own conscience or common
sense rebels, means ranking the law and, therefore, the state higher than the individual’s ability and
right of judgement. Saying conscience is paramount, however, potentially means disrespecting
laws, which were passed by a legally elected parliament. Beyond this, making individual decisions
against the law might also mean risking the weakening of state protection. The already familiar ex-
pectation is that the wish for state protection may make people favour the conservative idea of civil
obedience to the disadvantage of a libertarian preference of individual judgement, not only in those
countries which were directly attacked by terrorists.
Respondents of all four Role of Government modules have been asked:
In general, would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there excep-
tional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if it means breaking the
law? (ZA4747: V8)
 Obey the law without exception
 Follow conscience on occasions
 Can’t choose
Looking at people’s attitudes on that issue, a clear change between the years 1996 and 2006 can be
noticed. The majority of the countries follow the trend from trust in people’s individual judgement
towards the belief in the virtue of civil obedience.
Focusing on those countries that have actually been attacked, this shift is particularly obvious in the
United States, where the most momentous terrorist attacks took place. Whereas constantly 40% of
respondents answered in favour of law obedience from 1985 to 1996, this number increased to 54%
in 2006. Spain is one of those countries where respondents expressed to be rather obedient to the
law in both surveyed modules. The constant presence of the ETA
5
in the country and its terrorist ac-
tivities might be a reason for this high level of state obedience. Nevertheless, between 1996 and
2006 the percentage increased from 62% to 67% of respondents favouring state obedience. Al-
though also in Great Britain acts of terrorism, here committed by the IRA
6
, are not unknown, the
level of state obedience compared to the belief in individual judgement is constantly comparably
low, at around 40%. The shift from 1996 to 2006 in favour of law obedience, which could be as-
cribed to the recent terrorist attacks, is rather marginal at only 3%. The percentage of German re-
spondents who answered that people should obey the law without exception increased substantially
from 23% in 1996 to 39% in 2006 in the West and from 25% to 32% in the eastern part of the coun-
try.
5 “Euskadi Ta Askatasuna” (Basque Homeland and Freedom) is a Basque terrorist organisation founded in
1959, which demands Basque independence from Spain and France.
6 The term IRA “Irish Republican Army” has been used for several paramilitary and terrorist organisations
fighting for reunion of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland in the 20th and 21st century.
There are some ISSP countries, however, where no development from liberal towards conservative
attitudes has taken place, at least not between the years 1996 and 2006, and countries where even a
slight shift towards liberal attitudes can be noticed. Here, one could argue, people remained rather
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untouched by the terrorist threats and attacks. The Jewish population of Israel is one of these exam-
ples – but being ‘untouched’ by terrorism can hardly mean being unfamiliar with it here. Omnipres-
ent armed conflicts and bomb attacks in Israel put respondents in quite a different situation than
that of other countries. It is not surprising that the terrorist attacks in the Western world do not seem
to have left such a deep impression on the Jewish population of Israel in terms of law obedience,
since they have been recurringly threatened in this manner for a long time. There was, however, a
substantial shift towards more conservative attitudes in Israel as well, but it already occurred be-
tween the module years of 1990 and 1996. The shock following the assassination of Israel’s Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by a radical Jew claiming to follow his conscience, might
have been a factor for this development.
The third item to be examined in this context directly addresses the question in which situations, if
any at all, the police should be allowed to suspend civil liberties without a court order. For this rea-
son, different scenarios were constructed concerning what the police should or should not be al-
lowed to do in order to prevent a possible crime. The scenarios differ in the hypothetical subject:
whose civil liberties would be infringed, as well as in the hypothetical consequences: what would
happen? While in 1985 and 1990 the ISSP asked about the protection of a criminal’s rights of pri-
vacy, in 2006 it is the suspicion of a planned terrorist act which might or might not justify the viola-
tion of people’s civil rights. The questions which we want to deal with here is whether the authorities
should be allowed to tap telephone conversations.
In 1985 and 1990 respondents were asked if the following was definitely allowed, probably allowed,
definitely not allowed, probably not allowed, or if they can’t choose:
Suppose that the police get an anonymous tip that a man with a long criminal record is planning
to break into a warehouse. Do you think the police should be allowed, without a Court Order …?
(ZA4747: V20)
 To tap his telephone
For the 2006 questionnaire the topic was brought to the “terrorism-context” by asking:
Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen: Do you think the au-
thorities should have the right to…? (ZA4700: V40)
 To tap people’s telephone conversations
Respondents had the possibility to answer: The authorities definitely should have the right, prob-
ably should have the right, definitely should not have the right, probably should not have the right
or can’t choose
Most countries that allow comparison over time for the “tap people’s telephone conversations”-item
show significantly more approval for this action if the people in question are suspected to be terror-
ists rather than simple burglars, with the very notable exceptions of Hungary and Ireland. For Hun-
gary we have already pointed to the exceptional situation in 1990, it remains unclear, however, how
its situation of political and ideological change might explain the very liberal outcomes in 2006. In
the Republic of Ireland, the rise of the new terrorism does not seem to change the respondents’
rather negative attitude towards tapping anybody’s telephone.
Strikingly conservative attitudes can be found in Norway where 82% of the respondents answered
that the police should definitely or probably be allowed to tap telephone conversations when a ter-
rorist act is suspected. Even when we take into account that also in this question an attitude shift to-
wards more support for national security issues might have taken place between the years 1996 and
2006, this comparison gives a good impression of how much more people are willing to expand the
authority’s power and privileges in case of a suspected terrorist act to happen, compared to lesser
threats such as burglaries.
Measuring the actual impact of people’s fear of terrorism on their attitudes towards civil obedience
is very restricted when merely looking at the plain frequencies. But even if there are other reasons
which could be responsible for the tendency we have observed, the huge shift in levels which took
place between 1996 and 2006 at least allows the assumption that the threats of the last years might
be one of those reasons. Furthermore, the shifting attitudes on tapping telephone conversations
once more show that many people are willing to suspend civil liberties in case of a suspected
terrorist act.
With a view to the thesis that direct national threats and the resulting feelings of vulnerability cause
people’s wishes for more state control, even at the risk of weakening individual rights, we will fi-
nally look at how respondents assess their governments’ performance in dealing with threats to na-
tional security. An item newly introduced in 2006 directly asks for this assessment. This allows pos-
ing a new question: Does the confidence in government performance influence people’s willingness
to grant a government more authoritarian powers in fighting terrorism? Two additional items newly
introduced in 2006 specifically ask which measures a government should be allowed to take when
terrorist acts are to be expected. Since there is no trend data available for these items, we are limited
to looking at the data of 2006. Respondents of 33 countries were asked whether they consider their
government to be very successful, quite successful, neither successful nor unsuccessful, quite unsuc-
cessful, very unsuccessful or if they can’t choose:
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7
7 Germany and Israel are reckoned here in form of the whole country, since data for the separated samples
are only available for 2006.
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How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following
areas? (ZA4700: V37)
 Dealing with threats to [Country’s] security
Furthermore, ISSP 2006 asked:
Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen: Do you think the au-
thorities should have the right to…? (V41, V43)
 To detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial
 To stop and search people in the street at random
Respondents had the possibility to answer: The authorities definitely should have the right, prob-
ably should have the right, definitely should not have the right, probably should not have the right
or can’t choose
In the following charts we can see respondents’ perceptions of governmental success in dealing with
threats to national security. The first figure relates to attitudes towards the suspension of civil rights
in terms of authorities being allowed to detain people for as long as they want without putting them
on trial. The second figure displays people’s attitudes towards the suspension of civil rights in terms
of the authorities being allowed to stop and search people in the street at random. We would expect
the following relation: Perceiving one’s own government as unsuccessful in dealing with issues of
national security most likely creates a lack of confidence in the government and its authorities. A
lack of confidence, however, makes it unlikely that people agree to the suspension of civil rights that
exposes them to the authority’s judgement.
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Figure 1.4 Association (2006) between the perceived success of the government in dealing with
threats of national security and attitudes towards authorities to have the right to detain
people for as long as they want without putting them on trial (in means)
The vertical axis ranges from 1 “Very unsuccessful” to 5 “Very successful”, the horizontal
axis ranges from 1 “Definitely allowed to detain people” (no support for Civil Liberties) to
4 “Definitely not allowed” (high support for Civil Liberties).
The charts clearly reveal a pattern. Most Western countries, particularly Finland, Denmark, Switzer-
land, Germany, and Australia are characterised by perceiving their governments as quite successful
in dealing with threats to national security. Furthermore, or perhaps particularly because of that
fact, they are rather willing to suspend civil rights, in terms of allowing the authorities to stop and
search people in the street at random as well as in terms of detaining people without putting them
on trial. Support for stopping and searching people is higher than for detaining them, especially in
Denmark and Finland. Nevertheless, these attitudes testify to a high level of confidence in the ad-
ministration and police, since it is very unlikely to give authorities such a free hand unless you trust
them not to abuse those privileges.
Other countries, in contrast, show substantially lower levels of perceived governmental success, and
at the same time respondents are less willing to suspend civil rights even in case of a suspected ter-
rorist act. In Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela the perceived governmental performance in deal-
ing with threats to national security is poorer than in any other ISSP country. Furthermore, there is a
strong resentment to suspending civil rights, in terms of allowing to stop and search people in the
streets as well as in terms of detaining people without putting them on trial. Amnesty International
accuses all these countries of detentions without trial (without the justification of a suspected terror-
ist act to happen) and imprisonment of people under appalling conditions (Amnesty International
Report, 2006). For Venezuela there even are reports on human rights violations by the police includ-
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ing unlawful killings of criminal suspects.
8
In South Korea the “National Security Law” guarantees
far-reaching and controversially discussed powers for the National Intelligence Service. In Taiwan
and South Korea, missing confidence in their own governments might go together with the knowl-
edge about the violation of civil rights and its consequences for the people nearby in China respec-
tively North Korea causing strong resentments towards any suspension of civil rights.
Also in the Philippines, Russia, Latvia, and Uruguay, the fear of arbitrary police behaviour, once
they are allowed to act without respect to civil rights, is a plausible determinant of the response be-
haviour. Even in Portugal one can assume that many people remember the times of dictatorship un-
til 1976, when authorities have frequently disrespected civil rights and have therefore caused a lack
of trust in the authorities. The only surprising country to be found in this cluster is Sweden. Since
the Swedish did not have to suffer from a totalitarian regime and lived rather peacefully during the
last 100 years, bad experiences with the authorities are probably less relevant in Sweden. But, the
Swedes only differ in their attitudes towards detaining people from the other Western countries. In
terms of letting the authorities search people in the streets at random, they are much more willing to
allow civil right suspension and in this respect fit again in the cluster of the other Western states.
Interesting are the results in Israel, caused by the special situation of national security in this coun-
try. The Jewish population perceives their government as very unsuccessful in dealing with threats
to national security, but, nevertheless, respondents show a high level of willingness to suspend civil
rights. In contrast to this, the Arab citizens judge their government’s performance as better, but they
are much less enthusiastic about the suspension of civil rights. These outcomes are not very surpris-
ing, since the Jewish population, even if their trust in authorities might not be too strong, probably
perceive a necessity of suspending civil rights for the purpose of improving national safety. The
Arab population, however, is at least in some regions much more at risk of being the object of the
police practices referred to in the items, and therefore, does not approve very much of the
suspension of these civil rights.
In summary, it is exactly the set of countries which, through their specific history and current politi-
cal setting, probably have the least stable civil rights situation where the rejection of possible in-
fringements of civil rights is highest among the citizens. In contrast, citizens of the supposedly well
established democratic countries appear to be more willing to grant the authorities new powers
which limit civil rights. This is easily explained if we take into account that it is probably not the
general evaluation of civil rights as such which shapes these results. The data presented here do not
carry immediate information on that, and we have no reason to believe them to vary much across
the countries all over the world. More likely, people probably judge the issues at hand against their
specific national experiences: It might be exactly the lack of civil rights enforcement which makes
people in countries like the Philippines or Venezuela detest the idea of giving police even more pow-
ers. Citizens in Denmark, Norway, or the Netherlands on the other hand would usually assume that
they have nothing to fear from their police. Thus, they are less hesitant to have their police equipped
with additional powers. A closely related logic probably shows through in the association of gov-
ernment performance and willingness to allow the searching of people at random. When moving to
the more severe infringement of individual rights that is implied by actually detaining people at
will, a relationship to perceived government performance in fighting terrorism is hardly discernible
anymore – that right may be simply too basic to be sacrificed for short term measures.
8 “According to statistics published by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in July, between 2000 and mid-2005,
more than 6,100 people were killed by police in 5,500 incidents. Of the nearly 6,000 police officers impli-
cated, only 517 were charged and fewer than 250 were under arrest.” (Amnesty International Report, 2006:
279).
2 Government’s Responsibilities to Provide Social Welfare
A basic topic of domestic policy and therefore also of the Role of Government surveys is, as the title
already states, the role of government in society. The item battery to be introduced in this chapter
asks whether it is part of the government’s role to provide for citizens’ basic social needs, such as
health care, a decent standard of living, a job for everyone and help for low-income students.
Depending on a country’s political history, welfare provision is more or less taken for granted by cit-
izens, as well as practised by their governments. In most advanced democracies, govern-
ment-backed social insurance programmes in the form of compulsory health insurance, elderly age
pension schemes and unemployment insurance have become established, even though on different
levels, since the early twentieth century. But the question of whether those socioeconomic issues
should be private matters or governmental responsibilities remains vivid in the political debate.
Mirroring different conceptions and ideologies, in countries all over the world there are different
forms of the welfare states established, based on different forms of interaction between the state, the
market and the family. Therefore, these forms of welfare state systems are characterised by more or
less governmental involvement, on the one hand, and individual responsibility, on the other hand.
Beyond this, they differ in how and among whom welfare supplies are distributed. A prominent
categorisation of these different types of welfare state has been established as “three worlds of wel-
fare capitalism” by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
In this chapter we will first have a general look at the level of support for several areas of welfare
provision in the different ISSP member countries over all four module years. This comparison en-
ables us to see how attitudes towards these different areas of welfare provision might have changed
over the 21 years between 1985 and 2006 and how they relate to each other. Furthermore, we will
have a look at some of the ISSP countries that are, according to Esping-Andersen, exemplarily rep-
resenting different types of welfare states. The data provide us with an impression of the extent to
which citizens are supporting the welfare state policies of the countries they live in and, beyond this,
how they judge their governments’ performance in these respects. Therefore, we will see how the cit-
izens’ demands and the governments’ performance relate to each other.
In all four module years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 the following questions were posed
8
:
On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility to…?
(ZA4747: V50, V52, V53, V55-V58)
A. Provide a job for everyone who wants one
C. Provide health care for the sick
D. Provide a decent standard of living for the old
F. Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed
G. Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor
In 1990, 1996 and 2006 two items were added:
H. Give financial help to university students from low-income families
I. Provide decent housing for those who can’t afford it
Respondents had the possibility to answer: definitely should be, probably should be, probably
should not be, definitely should not be or can’t choose
8 Items B and E of this item battery deal with economic intervention of the government and will be intro-
duced in the next chapter.
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The data clearly show that there has been almost unlimited support in all countries over all module
years for the idea that the government should be responsible for providing health care for the sick
(item C). Between 80% and almost 100% of the respondents in all ISSP countries support this issue.
Likewise, governments’ financial help to university students from low-income families (item H) is
generally approved by the respondents of all societies over the available three module years. Except
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Figure 2.1 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the go-
vernment to provide health care for the sick (in %)
of Japan, showing only about 50% of the respondents thinking this support is definitely or probably
the responsibility of the government, among the other countries this level ranges between 70% and
100% of respondents. At first glance we see surprisingly low levels of support for this issue in the
Scandinavian countries. Sweden even ranks behind Japan as the second least supportive of all 33
countries participating in the 2006 module in terms of “providing financial help for students from
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Figure 2.2 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the go-
vernment to give financial help to university students from low-income families (in %)
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low-income families”. That residents of the Scandinavian countries put so little weight on this issue,
however, might not be due to a lack of support for students in general. Since the welfare system in
Scandinavia is highly developed and support for students is granted regardless of the socioeco-
nomic status of their parents, respondents might have been rather surprised that the question only
referred to students from low-income families. Approval would probably have been higher had the
question asked for financial help for all students, regardless of their financial background.
A comparison of the items F, I and D, all asking for the governments’ responsibility to provide a de-
cent living standard for different beneficiaries, clearly shows that the public support for state organ-
ised welfare also depends on who is going to receive the benefits. The charts below demonstrate this
impressively on a few examples representing the vast majority of countries.
As we can see in the chart, people highly support the idea of state responsibility in terms of provid-
ing a decent standard of living for the old (item D). In 30 out of 33 countries, however, people are
less enthusiastic about the idea of the government providing decent housing for “those who can’t
afford it” (item I) than for the old, and in 29 out of 33 countries, they are the least approving of the
idea of the government supporting those who are unemployed and cannot afford a decent standard
of living for this reason (item F).
The support for those who suffer from the consequences of unemployment has weakened over the
years in 17 of the 22 countries for which trend data is available. These results match the outcomes of
item A, showing attitudes towards support for “the government’s responsibility of providing a job
for everyone who wants one”, as one possibility of reducing unemployment.
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Figure 2.3 Respondents (2006) who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of
the government to provide a decent living standard for the old (item D), decent housing
for those who can’t afford it (item I) and a decent standard of living for the unemployed
(item F) (in %)
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Figure 2.4 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (in %)
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Support for “providing jobs” also declined over the years in most ISSP countries and is especially
low in the more advanced countries. In 2006, in Australia, Canada and the USA, all countries with a
well established free-market ideology, it is even the absolute majority of people, who say that it
should definitely or probably not be the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone
who wants one. A socialist history and high unemployment rates may be reasons for the high sup-
port on this item we can observe in other, mainly less advanced, countries.
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Figure 2.5 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably the responsibility of the govern-
ment to provide a job for everyone who wants one (in %)
Another issue that welfare states do more or less take care of is the reduction of differences in in-
come between the rich and the poor.
In 2006, it is the absolute majority of people in almost all countries, except New Zealand and the
USA, that support the idea of the reduction in income differences (item G) set by the government.
The trend data even show that there is a slight increase in support for this issue in 15 out of 22 coun-
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Figure 2.6 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (in %)
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tries over the period of up to four module years. This result is especially interesting when compared
to the previous item. On the one hand, the willingness to support the unemployed decreases. But, on
the other hand, that does not seem to indicate that people agree with all consequences of unre-
strained market forces. The increasing support for government initiated income redistribution may
well be a counter-reaction to the increase of income inequality that has been observed for a number
of OECD countries in recent decades (Atkinson, 2003).
The organisation of welfare is very different across societies. National specific institutional configu-
rations
9
make a comparison of welfare regimes difficult, if not impossible. But, that also means that
there can be numerous different approaches for a categorisation of welfare states.
10
We have chosen
the probably most prominent classification according to Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999), who distin-
guishes between four
11
different models of what he calls welfare regimes, for our categorisation:
 the “liberal model”, relying on the markets and characterised by little involvement of the go-
vernment in the provision of social welfare, with social security seen to be a matter of individual
responsibility;
 the “conservative model” assumes the standard male bread-winner family and is based on a hig-
her level of state involvement with high levels of social insurances, mainly financed by contri-
butions from dependent workers;
 the “social democratic model”, securing a high level of universal social welfare, financed mainly
through taxes; rights are based on citizenship and attached to individuals, not to families, which
guarantees women the same benefits as men;
 and the “familialistic model”, characterised by the provision of a rather basic level of social secu-
rity by the government, which makes the role of the family in welfare production especially im-
portant.
The ISSP data shed light on how far citizens from different countries support the ideas of the welfare
state systems they live in. Besides, newly introduced questions from ISSP 2006 will help to find out
not only about the opinions regarding to what degree governments should be responsible, but also
about the perceived level of success that governments reach with the policy they use. Respondents
in 2006 were asked if they perceived their government as very successful, quite successful, neither
successful nor unsuccessful, quite unsuccessful, very unsuccessful or if they can’t choose:
How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following
areas? (ZA4700: V35, V36, V39)
 Providing health care for the sick
 Providing a decent standard of living for the old
 Fighting unemployment
We are now going to have a close look at some prominent examples of countries that can be as-
signed to each welfare state model according to the “Esping-Andersen scheme”. ISSP representatives
of the liberal welfare state are the USA, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia. For the conserva-
tive welfare state model we will focus on East Germany, West Germany and France. The social dem-
ocratic welfare state is represented by the Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland and
9 About the diversity of welfare state programmes, see Pestieau, 2006: 21f.
10 For an overview on the different approaches of categorization of welfare states see Bonoli,1997.
11 Esping-Andersen originally carved out three distinct welfare state regimes in his book “Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism” (1990). The “Mediterranean/East Asian fourth world” constructed by Esping-Ander-
sen (1999: 89f.) is more an additional offer for special research interests and a reaction to different critics
such as Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Lessenich, 1995; Castles, 1996 as well as Jones, 1993; Rose and
Shiratori, 1986.
Denmark, whereas for the familialistic model we will have a look at Portugal, Spain and Japan. The
intention is to see, on the basis of the ISSP data, whether these countries fulfil the underlying expec-
tations in attitudes, which can be assumed to have partly been shaped by the system people live in.
Furthermore, we will get an impression of how content those respondents are with their govern-
ments’ performances.
The USA is the most prominent example representing the liberal welfare state model. Looking at all
“welfare-state-items”, the USA is in international comparison always among those countries where
respondents do not show a very high level of responsibility of the state in providing social welfare.
The only exception is “financial help to students of low income families” which is highly supported
in the USA as well. However, generally, US Americans’ attitudes towards the welfare state nowadays
seem to have become somewhat more approving of state responsibility than during the 1980s and
1990s. Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand are another three countries that can be assigned to
the liberal welfare state model. While Australia and New Zealand show in most respects quite similar
outcomes to the USA, the British seem to expect more involvement from their government. Espe-
cially in terms of providing a job for everyone, providing a decent living standard for the unem-
ployed and the reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor, the differences be-
come very obvious.
Looking at the results of the items on governments’ performance in terms of “providing health care
for the sick”, the success in Great Britain is perceived to be better than it is the case in Australia, in
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Figure 2.7 Association (2006) between governments’ responsibility to provide health care for the sick
and the governments’ successful in doing so.
The horizontal axis ranges from 1 “Definitely should not be responsible” to 4 “Definitely
should be responsible”; the vertical axis ranges from 1 “Very unsuccessful” to 5 “Very suc-
cessful”.
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Australia better than in New Zealand and in all three countries better than in the USA. However, we
can see that the expectations towards government actions stand in an appropriate relation to these
outcomes: the lower the level of expectations, the lower the perceived level of success. The USA
proves to be the most definite example of the liberal welfare state. In international comparison, US
American respondents do not expect as much from their government as respondents in other coun-
tries and coherently they judge it to be at best moderately successful.
12
The empirical findings for
the liberal welfare state countries let us assume that those citizens who live within a rather limited
welfare state do not necessarily see this as a deficit.
Famous examples for the “conservative model” are Germany and France. The vast majority of re-
spondents of both countries support the idea of government-organised welfare as it is practised in
their countries. Except of “providing financial help to students from low-income families” and “pro-
viding health care for the sick”, the expectations of government involvement are higher in France
and Germany than in the USA, Australia and New Zealand. In terms of the reduction of income dif-
ferences between the rich and the poor, Germany is pretty much on the same level as Great Britain,
whereas the French are more enthusiastic. Over all items, expectations on social welfare support to-
wards the government are higher in the eastern part of Germany than in the western part. East Ger-
many’s socialistic roots are most certainly the reason for these outcomes.
The conservative welfare state model is more supportive than the liberal model. The data show that
people living with this concept expect more support from their governments than those who live in
countries where the ideological foundation stresses the responsibility of the individual.
The chart shows the respondents’ expectations of their governments to provide a job for everyone
who wants one in relation to the perceived success of governments in fighting unemployment. The
countries in the top left quarter can be characterised by not feeling the need of governments’ in-
volvement to providing jobs, probably because they already perceive their governments as quite
successful in fighting unemployment. Respondents in countries located in the down right quarter,
however, do want their governments to take responsibility for providing jobs and they do not per-
ceive them to be very successful in this respect so far. West Germany and France are placed in the
down left quarter of the chart. This position indicates expectations to be not particularly high, but
still higher than in those countries with a liberal welfare state. The governments’ success, however,
is perceived to be much lower than in those “liberal” countries. The French and the people in West
Germany therefore may be rather discontent with their countries’ welfare policies. In the eastern
part of Germany the situation is even worse, since the divergence between expectations and per-
ceived fulfilment is even higher.
The most developed welfare state is the “social democratic model” represented here by the Scandi-
navian countries. In general, attitudes in these countries appear, as expected, very supportive to-
wards welfare state issues. In almost all respects, Scandinavian respondents express more approval
of state responsibility than respondents experiencing liberal or conservative welfare state models.
Only in terms of providing a job for everyone and especially the reduction of income differences be-
tween the rich and the poor the picture is not that clear. Concerning the provision of jobs, all Scan-
dinavian countries are more enthusiastic than the representatives of the liberal welfare state model,
but only Norway shows more support for this idea than West Germany and France. Concerning the
12 These conclusions have to be seen in international comparison. US Americans do undoubtedly not expect
as much support from a welfare state as the citizens of most other countries do. However, there are, after
all, in 2006, 55% of the US respondents who think it should definitely and 35% who think it should proba-
bly be the responsibility of the government to provide health care for the sick and it is only 4%, who think
the government has been very successful and 21%, who think it has been quite successful in doing so.
reduction of income differences, the conservative representative, France, appears unexpectedly sup-
portive while the social democratic, Denmark, is not as enthusiastic as expected. The comparably
weak support for helping low-income students in the Scandinavian countries indicates the
deep-rooted understanding of universalism that is the basis of a social democratic welfare state. As
mentioned before, this probably results from the reference to “students from low-income families”,
which excludes other students from state support.
Figure 2.7 shows the Scandinavian countries to be located relatively close to each other in terms of
expectations and perceived governmental implementation of providing health care. In Norway,
Denmark and Finland, people expect somewhat more responsibility from their governments than in
Sweden. But also governmental success is perceived as lower in Sweden than in Finland and Den-
mark. Only Norway shows a discrepancy here: high demands, but a comparably low level of per-
ceived success, that might lead to a rather high level of discontent in Norway in terms of govern-
mental provision of health care.
The locations of the Scandinavian countries in Figure 2.8 lie much more distant from each other, at
least on the axis indicating governmental success in fighting unemployment. These outcomes very
clearly mirror the national unemployment rates that are significantly higher in Finland and Sweden
than in Denmark and Norway.
13
They lead to the conclusion that people who live within social dem-
ocratic welfare states do react on unemployment rates and view the government as responsible for
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Figure 2.8 Association (2006) between governments’ responsibility to provide a job for everyone who
wants one and governments’ success in fighting unemployment
The horizontal axis ranges from 1 “Definitely should not be responsible” to 4 “Definitely
should be responsible”, the vertical axis ranges from 1 “Very unsuccessful” to 5 “Very suc-
cessful”.
13 For an international comparison of unemployment rates see: OECD-Statistics: Harmonised Unemployment
Rates and Levels.
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them. But, unlike many other countries, they do not seem to perceive “providing a job for everyone
who wants one” as an appropriate instrument for fighting unemployment. Labour market policies,
such as investment in occupational retraining to increase the job opportunities for the unemployed
might be seen here as more appropriate instruments.
Spain and Portugal are here taken as representatives of the “mediterranean-familialistic” model. In
both countries social welfare highly depends on well functioning family networks, but the data
show that people actually approve very much of the idea of state organised welfare. In 2006 there
are for all welfare related items around 90% of respondents from both countries supporting the idea
of state’s responsibility on these subjects. One factor that these countries share and that might come
into action here is the omnipresence of the Catholic social doctrine holding that public institutions
should care about those unable to do so for themselves (Greeley, 1989: 487).
Another country where welfare provision highly depends on family support, and which, therefore,
can be counted under the “familialistic” model, is Japan. Japan is in all welfare state-issues among
those countries with the lowest preference for government responsibility. These attitudes probably
result out of ideological and historically grown convictions that caring for the social needs of an in-
dividual are families’ and not governments’ duties.
Looking at the chart above that shows attitudes towards the welfare state issue of providing health
care for the sick, we can see that expectations in Portugal and Spain lay almost on the same high
level, as the countries representing the social democratic welfare state. In contrast to the Spanish,
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Figure 2.9 Association (2006) between governments’ responsibility to provide a decent standard of
living for the old and governments’ success in doing so
The horizontal axis ranges from 1 “Definitely should not be responsible” to 4 “Definitely
should be responsible; the vertical axis ranges from 1 “Very unsuccessful” to 5 “Very suc-
cessful”.
who are quite content with their government’s success, the Portuguese are much less satisfied with
the performances of their government. Among all 33 ISSP countries of the year 2006, satisfaction
with the government with regard to providing health care is poorer only in Latvia and Russia. The
Japanese have, next to Switzerland and South Korea, the lowest expectations of their government to
provide health care. Even in the countries that can be assigned to the liberal welfare model, demand
is higher, while perceived success is not particularly high. In this respect Japan is on the very same
level with the USA.
In all three countries, which belong here to the “familialistic” model, welfare state support in fact is
rather low and the families and social networks have to work well to be able to compensate. The
striking difference is that the Japanese seem to accept that concept while the Spanish and Portu-
guese expect more support from their governments. The difference between Spain and Portugal,
however, is that the Spanish perceive to get that support and therefore are not as unsatisfied with
their government as the Portuguese.
In a very descriptive manner, we have shown some attitudes towards state responsibilities and per-
ceived success on the same issue in the charts. It becomes quite obvious that countries, although
they can be assigned to the same welfare state model, are not necessarily very close in their attitudes
and perceptions of certain welfare state issues. The Swedes, for example, often referred to as living
within the prototype of the social democratic welfare state model, seem to become more and more
dismissive of state responsibility and generally appear less content with their government’s perfor-
mance than the Norwegians. Japan, Portugal and Spain apparently have in common that responsi-
bility for welfare provision is assigned to private families, but only Spain and Portugal share rather
high expectations towards the government in this matter.
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3 Government’s Intervention in the Economy
While the previous chapter looked at the immediate ‘exchange’ between the state and its citizens –
welfare benefits and taxes –, the current chapter deals with people’s attitudes towards the role of
government in the economy at the systemic level. Should governments try to ‘steer’ economical
processes, or should self-regulation of the markets prevail? To measure those attitudes, the ISSP
asked whether the respondents were in favour of the government controlling basic market stan-
dards, such as wages and prices. Beyond this, people were asked what they think about the govern-
ment actively guiding the economy and taking regulating action to protect and create jobs. On the
one hand, a passive role of the government in the economy means to leave the development to the
free market and its rules. This, thereupon, might aggravate social inequality within the society. Ac-
tive involvement in the economy as well as in socioeconomic issues, on the other hand, necessarily
makes the government’s administration grow and increases the tax burden. Furthermore, big gov-
ernments run the risk of becoming inflexible and ineffective. Therefore, government’s involvement
as well as non-involvement has far-reaching consequences on a society and its citizens.
In this chapter we will concentrate on whether public attitudes have changed over the last two de-
cades – and if they have changed, whether the development has taken place in favour of govern-
mental intervention or rather in favour of free market ideas. Bearing those results in mind, it will be
interesting to see if certain patterns of equally developing national attitudes across countries with
similar prerequisites can be identified. This examination will focus on the former socialist countries
that have been subject to common historical and ideological influences. Moreover, their citizens are
in a quite similar situation now, sharing experiences with systems of state ownership and a centrally
planned economy whereas lately they have to face the new free-market oriented developments in
their countries. Have the attitudes of citizens in theses countries moved in a consistent way between
the two ideological poles? Put in other words, is it the heritage of the past that we see in people’s at-
titudes even in recent years, or have they adjusted to ideas of capitalism in the meantime?
As a last step, we will compare cross-national attitudes on two different forms of governmental ac-
tivity: on the one hand interventions in the economy and, on the other hand, the provision of wel-
fare state supplies for the citizens. We will take a look at the relationship of these two issues with
each other and how that relationship might have changed during the 21 years the Role of Govern-
ment modules cover. Once more the underlying question is whether the radical change of systems
from socialism towards capitalism that took place in many countries in the early 1990s somehow
manifests in the data.
In all modules the ISSP asked:
Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you
are in favour of and which you are against. (ZA4747: V29-V34)
A) Cuts in government spending
B) Government financing of projects to create new jobs
C) Less government regulation of business
D) Support for industry to develop new products and technology
E) Support for declining industries to protect jobs
F) Reducing the working week to create more jobs
Respondents had the possibility to answer: strongly in favour of, in favour of, neither in favour
nor against, against, strongly against or can’t choose
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and:
On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility
to:…(ZA4747: V51, V54)
G) Keep prices under control
H) Provide industry with the help it needs to grow
Here respondents had the possibility to answer: definitely should be, probably should be, probably
should not be, definitely should not be or can’t choose
A first observation is that in most of the countries and all over four module years, support is strong
for governmental actions enabling industries to help themselves, such as governments “financing
projects to create new jobs” (item B), giving “support for the industry to develop new products and
technology” (item D) and “providing industry with the help it needs to grow” (item H).
Australia
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany-West
Germany-East
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland
Israel-Jews
Israel-Arabs
Italy
Japan
Latvia
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 %
1985 1990 1996 2006
Figure 3.1 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government financing projects to create
new jobs (in %)
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Figure 3.2 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government supporting the industry to
develop new products and technology (in %)
40 GESIS-Arbeitsbericht Nr. 7
With only some exceptions the outcomes show that attitudes towards these issues are very stable
within the countries and over the years. One of theses exceptions is New Zealand, where we can ob-
serve more enthusiasm towards government intervention in 2006 than in 1996 in terms of “financ-
ing projects to create more jobs”. The outcomes for the USA stand out even more since attitudes have
become substantially more supportive towards government involvement in 2006 compared to the
years before over all three items. One explanation for this shift might lie in the bursting of the so
called “dot-com bubble”. The boom in internet and communication technologies had been accompa-
nied by a huge extent of speculation in the stocks of so called dot-com companies, which finally
came to an end in a crash of that sector of the stock markets. Between March 2000 and October
2002, many of the dot-com companies went bankrupt causing high unemployment and job insecu-
rity. Another explanation might be the fears of a world-wide recession after the terror attacks of
September 2001. However, although both crises have had an impact on the stock markets of all
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Figure 3.3 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government providing industry with the
help it needs to grow (in %)
Western nations, we do not see attitude reactions towards more state intervention by supporting the
industry to create and protect jobs in Western countries except the USA. In Germany and Great Brit-
ain, there even is a distinct decline of the support for state intervention.
In contrast to these examples of rather indirect government intervention in the economy, direct in-
tervention seems generally to be perceived as less desirable.
On the question of whether or not people are in favour of less governmental regulation of business
(item C) in most countries between 40% and 60% of respondents express attitudes in favour of less
intervention. A marked shift towards a strong resentment against governmental intervention can be
observed between 1996 and 2006 in Germany, in the eastern part of the country even a bit more
than in the western part. In Poland and the Czech Republic, a shift in the same direction took place
Attitudes towards the Role of Government 41
Australia
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany-West
Germany-East
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland
Israel-Jews
Israel-Arabs
Italy
Japan
Latvia
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
1985 1990 1996 2006
Figure 3.4 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of less regulation of business by the government
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between those years, whereas in Russia, Japan, and Israel shifts towards more appreciation of gov-
ernment intervention can be observed. Strikingly high is the level of appreciation of government in-
tervention in Russia. The Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland have experienced steady economic
growth after the system change (World Fact Book, 2006). Respondents in these countries can be
content with the recent developments and consequently express their appreciation of less regulation
of business by the government. The increase of wealth was more rapid in Slovenia than in the other
countries, which might explain the high outcomes on this item already in 1996, while in the Czech
Republic and Poland the shift in attitudes can be noticed not until 2006. For Russia, these outcomes
cannot be explained by economic developments, because the Russian economy experienced a de-
cline in growth directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the years before the ISSP survey in
1996. However, in the years before the ISSP survey 2006 the Russian economy recovered and
showed a positive trend. Factors specific to the Russian system may be pegging support for free
market ideas at its extremely low level.
According to their history and ideological roots, the USA and Australia could be expected to show
very positive attitudes towards free-market ideas, which means in this context strong support for
less governmental regulation of business. The outcomes, however, show that support in both coun-
tries, compared to other ISSP member countries, is only around average (for Australia it is even de-
creasing between 1996 and 2006). But, this does not necessarily contradict the idea that the popula-
tions of the USA and Australia stand firmly in a pro-market belief system. It must be kept in mind
that the statements given by citizens in response to the ISSP items always refer to hypothetical
changes in a realised level of state activity. It is these changes that the respondents are measuring
against the current status quo and their own ideological beliefs. Thus, US or Australian citizens
might make relatively moderate statements about state interventionism because even the level of in-
terventionism attained after the changes would still be comparatively low.
The same fact should be kept in mind when looking at the next item concerning the support for cuts
in government spending.
In most of the 22 countries offering trend data, the idea of cuts in government spending is supported
by a majority of respondents. It is only in 2006 that the majority of respondents for spending cuts
has turned into a minority in some more countries (Australia, Ireland, Russia, and Switzerland, at
levels of between 30% and 40%). Great Britain has always been on very low levels of support in this
respect.
So, the data show that people in most countries generally support cuts in government spending.
However, we have already seen that interventional actions of the government, such as financing
projects to create new jobs or providing support for the industry to develop new products and tech-
nology, are generally supported at the same time. These somewhat inconsistent response distribu-
tions might, on the one hand, be based on the respondents’ wish of gaining both: the advantages of
an active and those of a passive role of government in terms of economic interventions. From a
methodological point of view some of the inconsistency might have been provoked by the switch of
the scaling direction made over the different items. While for all the other items of that item-battery,
“strongly against” means being strongly against government intervention in the economy, in the
case of “cuts in government spending” and “less regulation of business”, “strongly against” means
the opposite, that is being in favour of an active role of government in economy. Some respondents
might have missed this switch.
Support for direct intervention of the government in the economy is generally weaker than for indi-
rect intervention, as tapped by items B, D, and H. Figure 3.6 shows respondents attitudes towards
governmental support for declining industries to protect jobs (item E).
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Figure 3.5 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of cuts in government spending (in %)
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The picture here differs remarkably between the countries. In Ireland, Israel, Italy, and Spain, the
support in all module years has, with between 70% and 80% of respondents approving, been strong
over all available module years, while in Canada, the Czech Republic and New Zealand, with only
around 30% and 40% support has always been comparably weak. In the USA one can see very stable
outcomes of around 50% for the first three module years. In 2006, however, this number strikingly
increased up to 67%. This attitude shift in direction of more enthusiasm towards government inter-
vention in the economy could already be observed at the other items in this context.
The lowest general support for governmental actions influencing the economy can be noticed for
“Reducing the working week to create more jobs” (item F).
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Figure 3.6 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government supporting declining indus-
tries to protect jobs (in %)
In most countries there has been a substantial decrease in support for this item over the years. The
USA and Australia are, and have been since 1985, especially unsupportive to the idea of reducing
the working week for the benefit of creating more jobs. Also in Russia, New Zealand, and the Czech
Republic support for such a government action has, at only between 20% and 30% of respondents
appreciating, always been very weak. In France, Ireland, Switzerland, and the Philippines support
substantially decreased between 1996 and 2006.
However, it might be questionable if this item can be seen in direct context with the other items on
government intervention in economy. Reducing the working week does not necessarily mean less
working hours with the same income for employees, as the proposal in some European countries
was. The construct could as well be understood to lead to less income for those who already have a
job. To the working individual, the assumed consequence of losing income is probably more threat-
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Figure 3.7 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the reduction of the working week by the
government to create more jobs (in %)
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ening than collective employment is desirable. The issue of reducing the working week to create
more jobs has been discussed with different background prerequisites in different societies at differ-
ent points of time. Therefore, the prevalent interpretations of the discourse can also be very diverse
across all our samples, even if these are from the same country.
An item that also implies more or less direct interventions in the economy is the control of prices
(item G). It should be noted that ‘controlling prices’ can be achieved through very different mea-
sures, ranging from the indirect approach of a strict monetary and fiscal policy to the very direct ap-
proach of the administration actually prescribing fixed prices for given products. While this item
does not allow strong conclusions about the specific measures that respondents prefer, it can be
taken for granted that the control of prices, in a very broad sense, is always under the responsibility
of the government (or the Central Bank). Thus, the item at least gives a good impression of the de-
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Figure 3.8 Respondents who think that the government should definitely/probably be responsible for
keeping prices under control (in %)
gree of attention that respondents want to see paid to this issue in relation to other government
tasks.
The item is taken from the item battery concentrating on welfare issues, introduced in the second
chapter. Since these items only have a four point scale, the “price control” item is not exactly com-
parable with the other items presented in this chapter, because those feature a five point scale in-
cluding a neutral “neither nor” category. Leaving that aside for now, the data show that support is
strong for governmental price control.
In all 22 countries, over all module years, an absolute majority of respondents think that the gov-
ernment should definitely or probably be responsible for keeping prices under control. The highest
response rates of over 90% can be found in Italy, Russia, Ireland, the Philippines, and within the
Arab population of Israel. Taking into account the high and unsteady inflation rates in these coun-
tries in the 1990s and the early 21
st
century (World Fact Book, 2006), those results are not surprising.
The least enthusiasm is shown by the Czech Republic, with comparably weak support for price con-
trol measures at 64% in 2006 – in 1996, this figure was still higher at 80%. In Great Britain, support
gradually declines over the years, from 90% in 1985, to 80% in 2006. In the USA, we can once more
see support for government activity increasing from 64% in 1996 to 78% in 2006. Apart from those
changes, the outcomes on this item are remarkably stable over time within the countries. Increasing
prices is an issue that citizens experience, and often suffer from, most personally and directly. So,
public opinion almost everywhere exerts a strong pressure on governments to act against this
problem.
Cross-national patterns
From the partly dramatic changes in attitude levels that we have observed between adjacent Role of
Government modules for a given country, it is apparent that national-specific influences, be they
short-term or long-term, have a strong impact on national results as well as on the general picture.
It might however still be true that more global trends and events produce systematic patterns that
hold at least for whole groups of countries, and in spite of national divergences give an overall
structure to all the different attitudes we have discussed so far. An example for such a pattern could
be expected among the former socialist countries, represented here with trend data by the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Slovenia and Russia. Arguably, in such countries, according
to their ideological roots, attitudes should have changed over the years from supporting the idea of
extended governmental intervention towards an increasing belief in free-market ideology (Lane,
2007). We will have a look now at the outcomes in these countries on the basis of the item that most
directly addresses governmental involvement in economy - that is, whether citizens wish more or
less governmental regulation of business (item C). The more respondents answer (strongly) in favour
of less governmental regulation of business, the smaller the mean value, indicating, that more
respondents tend to approve of free-market ideas.
Taking into account the time frame of ten – in the case of East Germany and Hungary sixteen –
years, the table shows that the assumption is true in the case of the Czech Republic, East Germany,
Poland, and Latvia. Attitudes in Slovenia have not changed much, whereas in Hungary (1996) and
Russia a change in attitudes towards favouring governmental intervention has taken place. While in
1996 39% of the Russian respondents approved of the free-market idea of less regulation of busi-
ness, in 2006 there are only 23% left. The average response value shifted from 2.82 to 3.26. Al-
though, as already mentioned above, official numbers clearly show economic growth within these
10 years of new economic policies in Russia
14
, the perceptions of these policies seem to be rather
negative.
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Table 3.1 Respondents’ attitudes towards less governmental regulation of business in 5 former socialist
states (in means)
MEANS
15 1990 1996 2006
Czech Republic 2.70 2.31
Poland 2.66 2.42
Slovenia 2.38 2.33
Russia 2.82 3.26
Latvia 2.73 2.46
Hungary 1.95 2.57 2.50
East Germany 2.77 2.60 1.98
Former Socialist means 2.637 2.470
In Hungary, however, the number of respondents expressing the wish for less governmental regula-
tion of business is on a very high level in 1990. After a decline in 1996, the numbers match the aver-
age of the other countries much more. Therefore, the high support for less regulation of business in
Hungary in 1990 could be interpreted as a strong counter-reaction against former policies that di-
minish to a “normal” level over the years as the new policies became established. East Germany, the
only other former socialist country for which data from 1990 is also available, does not show similar
outcomes, but here we have an extraordinary close relation and therefore orientation towards the
western part of Germany, offering very good conditions for a system change. Phenomena like in
Hungary almost necessarily lead to an extension of the original question: it should not only be
asked whether people’s attitudes within the former socialist Eastern European countries are becom-
ing more free-market oriented, but rather: are they accommodating to their Western European
neighbour countries? The table below shows the means for the attitudes towards governmental reg-
ulation of business in the former socialist states and the single and average outcomes for five
Western European countries for comparison.
Table 3.2 Respondents’ attitudes towards less governmental regulation of business in 5 Western Euro-
pean states (in means)
MEANS 1996 2006
West Germany 2.47 2.02
France 2.16 2.36
Great Britain 2.66 2.57
Switzerland 2.55 2.70
Sweden 2.63 2.61
Western European means 2.494 2.452
Former Socialist means 2.637 2.470
Gap in means 0.143 0.018
The gap between the country group means of the former socialist states and their Western European
neighbours, here represented by West Germany, France, Great Britain, Switzerland and Sweden, in-
deed declines slightly between 1996 and 2006. However, the results show that although the overall
mean is a little lower for the Western states, individual countries of this cluster show less free-mar-
ket orientation in terms of our item than some of the Eastern cluster. Great Britain, for example,
15 MEANS (item C) vary between 1 “Strongly in favour of” and 5 “Strongly against”.
shows higher means than the Eastern European average in both years. As already stressed, that is
primarily because of the great differences in the levels of governmental intervention in a certain
state at the time when the respondents are asked. So, taking into account the national-specific roots,
political events and developments, a one-dimensional model of change, even among countries with
certain similar prerequisites, does not seem to work too adequately to explain the differences in
attitude between these countries.
As a last step, we want to look at the structure of national attitudes towards governmental interven-
tion in the economy, compared to attitudes towards interventions in the form of social welfare mea-
sures
16
(see chapter 2) over time. The question we want to address here is whether the relationship
between supporting these two issues stays the same despite the various changes in ideology, politics
and global economy, short- and long-term, that have taken place over the last twenty years. In other
words: Even with national populations changing their average attitude positions on each of these
issues quite profoundly over time, is there still a ‘market-liberal’ syndrome and a ‘pro-intervention-
ism’ syndrome? Have these ideological patterns survived the changing environment over the last
decades?
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Figure 3.9 Association (1985) between attitudes towards governmental intervention in economy and
welfare state issues (means)
Welfare variables, on the vertical axis, range from 1 ‘Definitely should not be’ to 4 ‘Defi-
nitely should be’; economy variables, on the horizontal axis, range from 1 ‘Strongly
against’ to 5 ‘Strongly in favour of’.
16 To compare attitudes towards issues of governmental intervention we computed the mean value over all
the items involved separately for the welfare state issues and the economy issues. Welfare state issues are:
A: provide a job for everyone, C: provide health care, D: provide decent living standard for the old, F: pro-
vide decent living standard for the unemployed, G: reduce income differences, H: give financial help to
university students, I: provide decent living standard for those who can’t afford it. In 1985 welfare state
items H and I were not surveyed.
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A short answer is that they apparently have survived at a global level, even with the changes being
massive at the level of each nation. Although the scales of both item batteries cannot be compared
directly because of the different ranges, the general trend becomes quite obvious when we look at
the country means for both issues. Over the 20 years, government intervention in the economy gen-
erally appears less popular than support for welfare state issues. But, as we can see in the chart, the
more government welfare support is desired in a country, the more intervention in the economy is
usually wanted as well. In 2006, many less advanced countries participated in the ISSP. In these
countries we observe the tendency of wanting more state intervention in both respects than in the
more advanced countries. Therefore, the cloud of all countries moved and expanded in 2006, com-
pared to 1985 to the top right of the chart. Interestingly, individual country outcomes of those coun-
tries originally observed in 1985 have changed in 2006 in such a way that the original pattern of as-
sociation has vanished. For example, the USA and Australia have become more enthusiastic towards
state responsibilities in both respects, while Germany has become less enthusiastic. Looking at the
larger picture of 2006, however, gives the impression of the association being entirely intact. The
countries that joined the ISSP since 1985 seem to have taken most of the positions vacated by these
original countries. Ideological structures may have changed massively within these ‘old’ Western
countries, but in a global perspective, there still is structure and consistency in economical belief
systems.
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Figure 3.10 Association (2006) between attitudes towards governmental intervention in economy and
welfare state issues (means)
Welfare variables, on the vertical axis, range from 1 ‘Definitely should not be’ to 4 ‘Defi-
nitely should be’; economy variables, on the horizontal axis, range from 1 ‘Strongly
against’ to 5 ‘Strongly in favour of’.
4 Government’s Spending Priorities
One basic aspect that shapes the role of every government in every society is the amount and the fo-
cus of public spending. This chapter concentrates on citizens’ attitudes towards governments’
spending priorities, building on eight ISSP items. Respondents were asked whether they would like
to see more or less public spending on policy areas which we have grouped into three dimensions:
“law and order”, “welfare state” and “post-materialistic” policy goals. To make respondents aware of
the conflict between the demand for more, or even much more, spending on certain areas, and the
omnipresent wish for a reduction or at least no increase of taxes, the question text includes the note:
“Remember that if you say “much more”, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.”
On the one hand, attitudes on government spending might be short-term reactions due to current
national political conditions, such as current budget changes, which can be, as we have already seen
in the previous chapters, quite different among the countries. On the other hand, we have also al-
ready seen that larger ideological or developmental patterns can provide some structure to the over-
all picture. In this chapter we will therefore try to use the ISSP items on spending priorities to make
some considerations about secular value change in societies. A popular point of departure for that
kind of endeavour is the theory of Ronald Inglehart, who has famously postulated a value shift from
materialism to postmaterialism in advanced industrial societies (Inglehart, 1977). Based on Abra-
ham Maslow’s “hierarchy of human needs” (Maslow, 1943), Inglehart assumes basic human needs,
such as physical and economical well-being, as well as safety demands, to give rise to materialistic
values. Postmaterialistic values, in contrast, are in this context driven by more abstract needs, such
as freedom, happiness, and self-realisation, and they only come into play after the basic, material
needs have been provided for (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 24). Inglehart’s theory argues that a soci-
ety’s values move from materialism to postmaterialism as a result of perceived physiological and
psychological safety, which can only occur in periods of material affluence and absence of war. The
longer these periods of material affluence last, the more people experience prosperity in their forma-
tive years, which, according to Inglehart, is a prerequisite for the manifestation of postmaterialistic
values in a society. After looking at the individual ISSP items in national comparison, we will exam-
ine whether different value priorities of materialism or postmaterialism can be observed in different
ISSP countries.
The ISSP item-battery on government’s spending priorities was surveyed in all four module years as
follows:
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to
see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much more”, it
might require a tax increase to pay for it. (ZA4747: V35-V42)
A. The environment
B. Health
C. The police and law enforcement
D. Education
E. The military and defence
F. Old age pensions
G. Unemployment benefits
H. Culture and the arts
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Respondents had the possibility to answer: spend much more, spend more, spend the same as
now, spend less, spend much less or can’t choose
We will take a look now at the results for individual items, and possible changes in attitudes over
time. The charts below show, for each country, the respondents’ spending priorities, as expressed by
agreeing to one of the two affirmative response categories in favour of (much) more spending.
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Figure 4.1 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on the envi-
ronment (in %)
Taking into account the vivid discussion about global warming within the media during the last
years, one might assume that an increasing collective awareness of environmental protection
should have developed within the societies. So, it could be assumed that the growing public interest
in that issue should also be visible in the data. But as we can see in the chart, responses do not turn
out to be as clearly in favour of that issue as expected. In half of the countries where data from 1996
and 2006 is available, respondents wanted even more government spending on environment in
1996 than in 2006. With the exception of Israel, all countries we have trend data for since 1990 or
1985 actually show the most interest in government spending for environmental protection in
1990. In 2006, the Dominican Republic, South Korea, and Ireland are, with around 70% of respon-
dents answering the government should spend (much) more on environmental protection, the coun-
tries where respondents place the most weight on this issue. Respondents in both parts of Germany
(East: 33%, West: 38%), the Netherlands (33%), New Zealand (36%), and the Scandinavian countries
(Finland 43%, Sweden 40%, and Norway 39%) are the least supportive of more government spend-
ing on environmental protection. It seems plausible that these outcomes mirror the current situation
in the respective countries. In the more advanced countries the level of the governments’ invest-
ments into this policy issue has increased over the last decades, not unlikely due to the public con-
cern felt in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of the most visible sources and consequences of environ-
mental pollution have thus been reduced. Hence, citizens might not see an urgent need to support
additional spending in this area.
17
In the less advanced countries, however, immediate environmen-
tal pollution could still be a more obvious problem. The new ISSP module on environment that will
be conducted in 2010, following the Environment modules of the years 1993 and 2000, might give
more information on this phenomenon.
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17 Another reason for the low appreciation of environmental issues might be that the ‘new’ debate
on climate changes uses a different terminology than the older debate over pollution. ‘The cli-
mate’ is not the same as ‘the environment’, and carbon dioxide emissions perhaps are not so
much regarded as a toxic ‘pollutant’, as e.g. pesticides or ozone emissions were, with there more
immediate effects even on human health.
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In chapter 2, we have already noticed that people across all nations participating in the ISSP think
that their governments are responsible for providing health care for the sick. Now we see that sup-
port for more and even much more government spending on this issue is strong across these coun-
tries as well. In 2006, more than 90% of the respondents in the Dominican Republic, Chile, among
the Arab population of Israel, Hungary, Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and South Africa want (much)
more government spending for “Health”. The lowest levels of support on this issue are observed in
Japan (60%), West Germany (58%), France (57%), Taiwan (55%) and, with only 49% of supporting
respondents, Switzerland. It is quite conceivable that these attitudes highly depend on the current
status quo of the country in question. For example, in Switzerland the vast majority of respondents
think that their government is already successful in providing health care for the sick (see Figure
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Figure 4.2 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on health
(in %)
2.7), while at the same time the level of health related expenses is very high already. Consequently,
there is no need for additional government spending on health.
The question on government spending on the police and law enforcement appeals to the respon-
dents’ need for safety. The outcomes differ as much across the countries as their internal political
situations do. In some countries, such as Portugal and Japan, the desire for more spending on this
area is very low (13% in Portugal, 23% in Japan in 2006). However, agreement to the same catego-
ries is, with around 80%, very high in other countries such as Uruguay and Ireland. In most coun-
tries, the outcomes are relatively stable over time. Exceptions are New Zealand, Hungary, Great Brit-
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Figure 4.3 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on the police
and law enforcement (in %)
56 GESIS-Arbeitsbericht Nr. 7
ain, and Germany, where the desire for more or even much more spending on the police and law en-
forcement was much stronger in 1996 compared to 2006.
Almost everybody has received state education in her or his life and thus has a pretty good idea of
what more spending on education would mean in terms of equipment and infrastructure to those
who are still at school. Beyond this, good public education is known to have a positive effect on so-
cial equality within societies. These are certainly some of the reasons why spending on education
generally has a high priority in all ISSP member countries.
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Figure 4.4 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on education
(in %)
The most developed countries, however, tend to show rather weak support for more spending on ed-
ucation. The lowest level of only 42% respondents on these answer categories can be observed in
Finland in 2006. Since the PISA studies
18
certified Finland to have an excellent education system,
respondents probably do not see any necessity of more spending in this area. The same might be
true for Japan. In Australia, Germany, and the USA, respondents have become increasingly support-
ive of this issue over the years since 1985. In Great Britain support increased as well until 1996, but
decreased in 2006.
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Figure 4.5 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on the mili-
tary and defence (in %)
18 For a comprehensive overview on the PISA study’s results see: OECD, 2006.
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Enthusiasm for more spending on military and defence is, at a rate of fewer than 10% of respondents
supporting this idea in some Western countries and a maximum of 63% among the Jewish popula-
tion of Israel and in Russia, comparably low. One reason for the low support of government spend-
ing on that area might be that the actual benefits for individuals on this issue are rather remote com-
pared to other items of this battery. Furthermore, people might be convinced that peace could be se-
cured better by cuts rather than by additional government spending on military and defence areas
(Haller, 1990).
It is interesting to see, however, that in almost all countries from which we have data since 1990 or
even 1985, the least support for increasing spending on the military and defence can be observed in
1990. The breakdown of the Soviet Union and therewith the end of the Cold War seem to have
cooled down the urgency of this matter for respondents almost cross-nationally. Beyond this, the
strong presence of the peace movements in the 1980s, protesting against nuclear weapons and
against the NATO Double-Track Decision
19
, might have had an impact on the respondent’s attitudes.
In the majority of the countries, however, support increases again between the years of 1996 and
2006 when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq might have brought the need for military and defence
back to the surface of respondents’ perceptions. Only 4% of the West Germans, for instance, who
had the Cold War in their front yard, wanted (much) more spending on this area in 1990. In 2006,
there were 12%.
Old age pensions and health are those areas where governments already have to spend the most
money on. Because of the demographic change towards aging societies, which usually goes along
with the modernisation process, governments will have to spend even more on these issues in the
future, if only to maintain the current standard. High support on these items in many countries
shows that most people have realised this fact and accept it. However, it is again the more advanced
countries, such as the Netherlands, France, Canada, and Denmark that show with only between 40%
and 50% of respondents lower support levels than the less advanced countries. Chile, Croatia, Ire-
land, the Arab population of Israel, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Uruguay, and Venezuela in
2006 show support levels for more government spending on old age pensions around 90%. That is
probably due to the fact that in the more advanced Western countries pension systems are better de-
veloped already than in the less advanced countries.
19 The NATO Double-Track Decision (December, 12th 1979), on the one hand, offered negotiations to the
Warsaw Pact about the mutual limitation of middle range nuclear weapons in Europe. On the other hand, it
announced, in case of unsuccessful negotiations, the deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons
in Western Europe.
Although, in times of mass unemployment in many countries, most people should have a good idea
of what investments in unemployment benefits would mean for the individuals concerned, this area
is quite unpopular as an area of increased government spending. We have already seen this phe-
nomenon in chapter 2, where respondents show rather weak support for the idea of governments’
providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed. The prevailing opinion seems to be that it
is to a certain degree people’s own fault if they are unemployed, so it should not be the societies’
duty to pay for it. The outcomes in 2006 show especially low support in New Zealand, with only 6%
expressing the wish for (much) more spending on unemployment benefits. Support in the Nether-
lands and Australia with 11%, and France as well as Great Britain with 13% is also rather low for
more spending on this area. Countries where a collective wish for more spending on this issue is ex-
pressed are Venezuela and Chile with 80% and 79%, South Africa with 70%, Croatia with 66%, and
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Figure 4.6 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on old age
pensions (in %)
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Uruguay with 62%. Again, these numbers certainly mirror the current situation in the countries in
question, with rather low levels of unemployment benefits. The higher the unemployment rates and
the worse the consequences of unemployment for the individual are, the greater the wish for more
governmental spending on unemployment benefits. Attitudes on this issue are, in the most coun-
tries, remarkably stable over time.
Government spending on culture and arts is among the least popular spending areas in all ISSP
countries. However, the differences in support for this issue vary greatly between the countries.
While in the Scandinavian countries, West Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Great Brit-
ain only 8% to 14% of the respondents express the wish for more or much more spending on culture
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Figure 4.7 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on unem-
ployment benefits (in %)
and arts, in Croatia it is 52%, among the Arab population of Israel and in Russia it is 53%, in the
Philippines 56%, in the Dominican Republic 62%, and in Venezuela even 71%. These results have,
once more, to be interpreted on the background of usually very low spending for culture and arts in
less wealthy countries.
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Figure 4.8 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on culture
and arts (in %)
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Let us have a look now at whether we can observe different value priorities within societies that are
at different stages of modernisation, through these data. Following Ronald Inglehart’s theory of
value change we should expect high appreciation of elementary, “materialistic” values within those
societies that have not experienced long periods of material affluence so far and where a high per-
centage of the population might have grown up lacking basic material needs. The ISSP items asking
for more government spending on “The police and law enforcement” and “The military and defence”
to some degree represent those materialistic values in our data. Postmaterialistic values are tenta-
tively assessed by the items on “Environment” and “Culture and Arts”. Appreciation of so called
“postmaterialistic” values should, according to Inglehart, be high in those societies which have ex-
perienced long periods of material affluence. In those societies the fulfilment of elementary, “mate-
rialistic” values can be taken for granted and people can generally “afford” to care more about their
quality of life, with regard to goals such as self-expression, aesthetic concerns and a healthy envi-
ronment.
Five ISSP member countries that experienced relatively peaceful and prosperous last decades after
World War II and currently produce a comparatively high GDP per capita
20
are Norway, the USA,
Sweden, West Germany, and France. Those ISSP member countries that produce the lowest GDP per
capita are in 2006 South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. From the
more advanced Western states the Inglehart thesis would predict higher spending priorities for the
postmaterialistic goals than for the materialistic goals, whereas expectations for the less advanced
countries are reversed. The table below shows the means and the rank of priority for the items
representing those values in the different societies.
Table 4.1 Advanced and less advanced countries, means and rank of the “postmaterialistic” items “En-
vironment” and “Culture and Arts” and two “materialistic” items “Police and Law enforce-
ment” and “Military and Defence”.
Environment Culture/Arts Police/Law Military/Defence
Country mean rank mean rank mean rank mean rank
West Germany 2.6 5 3.3 7 2.5 4 3.5 8
France 2.4 3 3.4 6 2.8 5 3.6 8
Norway 2.6 5 3.5 8 2.1 2 3.4 7
USA 2.5 5 3.1 8 2.4 4 2.8 7
Sweden 2.6 5 3.4 7 2.2 2 3.5 8
Uruguay 2.5 6 2.6 7 1.8 4 3.5 8
Venezuela 2.4 7 2.1 6 2.0 5 2.6 8
South Africa 2.6 6 2.7 7 2.1 5 2.8 8
Chile 2.7 6 2.7 7 2.4 5 3.3 8
Dominican Rep.
21
2.3 4 2.3 5 2.4 6 2.5 7
The outcomes clearly show that respondents in less developed countries generally tend to demand
more spending on all areas offered, compared to the advanced countries. That is not surprising,
since they currently spend on lower levels. But the priorities of the spending areas do not vary as ex-
pected according to Inglehart’s theory. The less advanced countries are expected to reveal higher
priorities for safety demands. But the data from 2006 show that in all those countries, spending on
the military and defence ranks at the last place of the priority-list, just as in West Germany, France,
20 For an international overview on the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita see: World Fact Book, 2006.
21 In the Dominican Republic questions on “unemployment benefits” were not posed. So, for this country, the
priority scale only reaches up to seven items.
and Sweden. In Norway and the USA, contrary to our assumptions, this item even ranks one place
better. The situation in the USA might be special, since the country has been at war with Afghani-
stan and the Iraq, recently. Beyond this, the terrorist acts of September 11
th
2001 might have caused
the feeling that war had taken place in their own country for some respondents and, therefore, gov-
ernmental spending on the military and defence might be given a higher priority by US-American
respondents than in other advanced countries. However, this explanation can hardly be true for
Norway. Spending on the police and law enforcement is also, contradictory to Inglehart’s theory,
generally more appreciated in the advanced than in the less advanced countries. While in Norway
and Sweden this item even ranks second behind “Health”, in the less advanced countries it enjoys
the most popularity in Uruguay, where it only ranks at place number four.
In the case of the postmaterialistic items, we have to distinguish between “Environment” and “Cul-
ture and Arts”. The results for spending priorities on the environment go along with Inglehart’s as-
sumptions. The ranking here shows substantially more enthusiasm among the more advanced coun-
tries, seen in relation to the other spending areas. But this is not true for the “Culture and Art” item.
In the Dominican Republic, it ranks even higher than in all of the advanced countries.
22
In Norway
and the USA, spending on culture and arts ranks at the last place on the popularity-scale – lower
than in all of the less advanced countries.
So, the results of this examination do not match Inglehart’s ideas very well. This could have many
reasons. One reason could be that the “less advanced” ISSP countries might already be too advanced
to show priorities on materialistic values instead of postmaterialistic values. Another issue could be
that national factors, such as policy changes, have such a strong impact on attitudes towards spend-
ing priorities that it is simply not possible to assess underlying fundamental values with this item-
battery.
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5 Taxation - Redistribution
Taxes are the main source of revenue for most modern states and thus are the prerequisite for any
kind of government spending. While indirect taxation, such as sales tax, is roughly equal for all citi-
zens of a certain country, direct taxes, such as personal income tax, often involve a progressive ele-
ment, meaning that those with higher incomes pay a larger share of their income in tax compared to
low-income earners. Hence, most public debates about taxation policies are also intrinsically linked
with the issue of the redistribution of wealth.
Therefore, this chapter will first look at the extent to which the people of the ISSP countries support
the general principle of government redistribution of income. For this, we will return to an item that
we have already briefly shown in chapter 2.
In a second step, we will move on to the practice of progressive income taxation. Respondents of the
ISSP surveys 1985 and 1990 were asked whether they think that those with higher incomes should
pay larger or smaller proportions of their incomes in taxes.
23
In 1996 and 2006 respondents were
given the opportunity to evaluate their own tax system’s distributive effects. Both sets of questions,
those of 1985/1990 and those of 1996/2005, basically express the same idea: The wish for redistri-
bution of wealth through targeted taxation of specific income groups. We will compare these out-
comes with the general desire for redistribution presented before and see if they match each other, or
whether there appear essential differences in attitudes on the general desire and its specific realisa-
tion through taxes.
The very same ISSP items may also shed some light on the dilemma that governments spending
money for public goods at one end have to collect that money at another end. The question that al-
most inevitably results is this: are people willing to pay for what they demand from the govern-
ment? Therefore, in the third part of this chapter we will examine whether people in favour of in-
creased government spending are also in favour of increasing taxes.
The first item looks at the principle of making the redistribution of income a government responsi-
bility.
In all four module years the ISSP asked:
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to..?
(ZA4747: V56)
 reduce income differences between the rich and poor
Respondents had the possibility to answer: definitely should be, probably should be, probably
should not be, definitely should not be or can’t choose
23 How adequately citizens are able to understand tax policy concepts in general, and especially through
standard survey items as they have been used in the ISSP, may be debatable. The question is whether peo-
ple really understand the progressive concept behind terms such as “proportion” and “percentage”. Some
argue that citizens’ understanding of these concepts is generally inadequate (Roberts, 1994). Others chal-
lenge this “non-attitude”-thesis. It has been proved, for example, that there is no evidence that people do
not understand the concept of progressive taxation in Sweden (Edlund, 2003). This uncertainty of respon-
dent’s understanding, however, should be kept in mind while analysing the data.
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As we have already seen when looking at this item in chapter 2, there is predominant support for re-
ducing income differences between the rich and the poor, over all countries and module years. Par-
ticularly high levels of support show Chile, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Af-
rica, Spain, Taiwan, and Uruguay at more than 80% of respondents in favour of government redis-
tribution of income. The other end of the distribution is occupied by some non-European countries
with an Anglo-American heritage: we observe comparably low support for government redistribu-
tion in the USA, New Zealand (with only between 40% and 50% of respondents in favour of redistri-
bution), Australia, and to a lesser degree, Canada. But also the Czech Republic, Japan, and Denmark
have rather low rates of agreement.
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Figure 5.1 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (in %)
With the next step, we turn to attitudes on progressive taxation, which is here expressed as differen-
tial taxation of different income groups.
In 1985 and 1990 the ISSP asked:
Some people think those with high income should pay a larger proportion (percentage) of their
earnings in taxes than those who earn low incomes. Other people think that those with high in-
come and those with low income should pay the same proportion (percentage) of their earning in
taxes. Do you think those with high incomes should... (ZA4747: V25):
 Pay a much larger proportion
 Pay a larger proportion
 Pay the same proportion as those who earn low income
 Pay a smaller proportion
 Pay a much smaller proportion
 Can’t choose
Attitudes on progressive taxation in 1985 and 1990 show vast majorities (between 56% in the USA
1985 and 91% in East-Germany 1990) in favour of those with high incomes paying a (much) larger
income proportion in tax in every country. Almost nobody (mostly under 1%) wants those with a
high income to pay smaller proportional taxes than those with a low income. Not very surprisingly,
the highest agreement to the category “pay the same proportion as those who earn low income” –
which means being in favour of a flat rate model instead of a progressive taxation model – are to be
observed in countries with predominant free market beliefs (cf. Ch. 3), such as the USA and Austra-
lia. With the exception of Great Britain, where respondents appear to favour progressive taxation
more in 1990 than they did in 1985, attitudes appear quite stable over the five years.
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In 1996 and 2006, the questions focused on public evaluations of the actual distribution of taxes
across different income groups.
Generally, how would you describe taxes in [Country] today? (ZA4747: V67-V69)
(We mean all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, tax on goods and services
and all the rest.)
 First for those with high incomes
 Next for those with middle incomes
 Lastly, for those with low incomes
Respondents were asked if they consider they consider taxes as much too high, too high, about
right, too low, much too low or if they can’t choose.
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Figure 5.3.1 Description (1996) of taxes for those with high incomes (in %)
Responses to the questions asked in 1996 and 2006 do not mirror the results from 1985/1990 ex-
actly. But the larger picture is quite the same: in the majority of countries, most respondents think
that people with a high income should pay higher taxes than they currently do, while for those with
a middle or low income, taxes are generally perceived as too high or about right.
In almost all countries in 1996 as well as in 2006, simple majorities of respondents support the prin-
ciple of progressive taxation, saying that taxes for those with a high income are still too low. Excep-
tions in 1996 are Ireland, Israel and most surprisingly, the Philippines with only 13% of respondents
answering taxes for those with a high income are too low and 47% saying taxes were too high. In
the USA, attitudes seem to be almost balanced between the two options. In 2006, attitudes in Ireland
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Figure 5.3.2 Description (2006) of taxes for those with high incomes (in %)
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and the USA shifted substantially towards the progressive idea, while in New Zealand, Australia and
Canada a shift towards the opinion that those with a high income pay too much tax can be observed.
The new participant South Africa shows quite similar outcomes as the Philippines do.
The results for the item asking about the situation for those with a middle income fit well into this
picture. In all countries and over both years, small minorities of less than 10% of the respondents
think taxes for this income group are too low. However, in 1996 in 7 out of 24 country-samples and
in 2006 in 9 out of 35 country-samples, simple and even absolute majorities are of the opinion that
taxes for those with a middle income are about right. Except for the Philippines in 1996 and South
Africa in 2006, in all ISSP countries over both modules absolute majorities of respondents perceive
taxes for those with a low income as too high.
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Figure 5.4.1 Description (1996) of taxes for those with middle incomes (in %)
The results so far suggest that the principle of progressive taxation receives strong public support,
and, further, that the public in a large majority of countries would welcome a political strategy de-
voted to increased tax progression. There are, however, some notable exceptions from this general
pattern. In New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, and to a lesser extent also in Venezuela, the
support for higher taxes for those with a high income is very low. The New Zealanders simply per-
ceive taxes for all income classes as rather too high than too low, which could be due to the already
well developed and extraordinarily efficient tax system (Dalsgaard, 2001). In contrast to all other
countries, in the Philippines and South Africa there are substantially more people who want higher
taxes for those with a low income, than there are people who support higher taxes for those with a
middle income. The Philippines are the most extreme outlier here, with even more respondents
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wishing higher taxes for those with a low income than there are respondents who want higher taxes
for those with a high income.
The reasons for that could lie in different factors. One of these, but one of particular interest in our
international setting, is the comparability of seemingly identical measurements across different
countries. When the concept of progressive taxation is not well understood by a majority of people
in a society, their response patterns will hardly look the same as in societies where progressive taxa-
tion is common practice. It is likely that in some countries, namely those with an omnipresent wel-
fare state based on a clear and transparent tax system, the everyday environment and the political
communication will have a stronger educational influence on the understanding of redistributive
concepts in the public. In these countries, citizens are simply better informed and the concepts might
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Figure 5.5.1 Description (1996) of taxes for those with low incomes (in %)
be better internalized by respondents, and therefore also better retrieved by the ISSP questions than
in countries without redistribution through taxation being common practice (Edlund, 2003).
We will now take a look at whether attitudes towards the general alleviation of social inequality
through a general income redistribution policy are different compared to the questions that related
specifically to taxation. Generally, we can observe that the more abstractly formulated principle of
government redistribution of income is more supported than the more concrete formulated practice
of progressive taxation. This becomes particularly clear in the examples of the Philippines, South
Africa and Venezuela. On the one hand, in 2006 68% of the respondents in the Philippines, 71% in
Venezuela, and in South Africa even 81% of the respondents support the principle of government
reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor. As we have seen in the section
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above, the practice of progressive taxation, on the other hand, is not supported in these countries at
all. In Venezuela in 2006 only 23% of respondents think taxes for those with high income are
(much) too low; not so many less think the same for those with middle and low income. This is by no
means a pattern typical of poorer countries: the Dominican Republic, Chile or Uruguay do not fit
into that pattern. The relative wealth of a country, therefore, seems not to play a straightforward role
for the dominant evaluation of tax paying responsibilities.
In the Anglo-American countries, the response distributions for the different sources match some-
what better. In international comparison, the support for government redistribution is rather weak
here. The same attitudes become clear on the items on progressive taxation. Still, for example in
Australia in 2006 after all 56% of respondents support the principle of redistribution, but only 26%
think taxes for those with a high income are too low. Either Australians are very content already
with the success of redistribution policies in their country, or these results might be an indicator for
the sympathy for the poor fading when it comes more concretely to paying.
In the USA, taking into account the free-market oriented background of this country, a remarkably
large number of respondents express the wish for higher taxes for those with a high income. These
attitudes might refer to a “super-rich” group of society that does not even exist in every society, at
least not to the extent or with the visibility that it does have in the USA. US Americans are, to a com-
parably high degree, against the reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor, but
they still seem to perceive that the “super-rich” might not pay their share to the appropriate extent
(Johnston, 2003). In other words, taxation does not seem to be understood as a redistributive tool
among US citizens, at least not to the same extent as in many other OECD countries, but rather as a
form of punishment (Edlund, 1999, 2003; Svallfors, 2006).
In conclusion, there is a general pattern that is valid in a large majority of countries: solid public
support for the principle of government income redistribution and progressive taxation. Also, when
the public judges their own current tax system, a large majority tends to support increased tax pro-
gression, although in some countries support turns out to be somewhat weaker when concrete
income groups are addressed.
Finally, the data of the 2006 module allow a check on the compatibility of respondents’ demands on
government expenses of any kind and their willingness to pay for these services. Chapter 4 has al-
ready introduced the question battery on government spending.
24
The introductory text for this bat-
tery includes the warning: Remember that if you say “much more”, it might require a tax increase to
pay for it.
It is obviously interesting to ask how many citizens hold consistent attitudes when it comes to the
relationship between taxation and public spending. How common is a “wanting something for
nothing mentality” in the public and, moreover, does it vary across countries? In figure 5.6, four
types of tax-spending attitudes are shown. The first bar for each country shows the percentage of
citizens that hold consistent attitudes, where consistency can occur in two ways: if they are in fa-
vour of “much more” spending on balance, they are also in favour of increased taxation. If, on the
other hand, they are not in favour of “much more” spending, they are also not in favour of increased
taxation. The second bar shows the inconsistent attitude set-ups, again, there are two of these. The
first is the “something for nothing” group: They want “much more” spending on balance, but they
are not willing to raise taxes. The last group consists of those that are not in favour of “much more”
spending, but still are in favour of increasing taxes.
25
Consistent answers are those either in favour of much more governmental spending and higher
taxes or those in favour of not much more governmental spending and no higher taxes. Inconsis-
tent, by contrast, are those answers, in favour of much more government spending but not favour-
ing higher taxes, and those, not in favour of much more government spending, but still in favour of
higher taxes.
The smallest groups over all ISSP countries are, on the one hand, the consistent type representing
respondents who express their wishes for generally much more government spending and accept in-
creasing taxes in return and, on the other hand, the inconsistent type of respondents who want more
taxes but not that much more government spending. Interestingly, the second group is even slightly
larger than the first in many countries, although one should assume that if people are all set to pay
more taxes, they might at least want to receive something in return.
The remaining two groups are much larger, comprising respondents who do not want tax increases.
One group indicates consistency, with respondents accepting the contingency between increased
spending and tax increases, and therefore wanting neither of these. The other large group comprises
respondents who, in contrast, show inconsistency by wanting “something for nothing”. As shown in
the figure, the shares of those two types vary greatly across countries. In 13 out of 33 countries, we
can see that the inconsistent category “wanting something for nothing” is larger then the consistent
category. In Ireland, this group of respondents is, at 67%, extraordinarily large. However, there are
20 countries where consistent attitudes prevail: in New Zealand, France, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land and Sweden even majorities of over 70% express their wishes for not wanting much more
government spending but at the same time not wanting taxes to increase.
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24 We are referring here to the item-battery about government spending introduced in chapter 4. Here the
ISSP asked: Listed below are various areas of government spending (The environment, Health, The police
and law enforcement, Education, The military and defence, Old age pensions, Unemployment benefits,
Culture and arts).
25 When we speak of respondents ‘wanting spending’, we refer to a preference for much more spending, aver-
aged over all kinds of government spending areas that the ISSP asked for. When we speak of respondents
being in favour of tax increases, we refer to agreement with taxes being much too low or too low, averaged
over all (high, middle, low) income groups.
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Figure 5.6 Relation between respondents who answered consistently and those who answered incon-
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The graphs show a pretty clear pattern. Predominantly, the citizens of comparably poorer countries
– but also of Ireland and Israel – want “something for nothing” from their governments. As noted
before, this is probably caused by the currently very low levels of social protection through the state,
confronted with high levels of poverty that make a concession towards more taxes almost impossi-
ble. In the wealthier, mostly Western countries, however, the pattern suggests that respondents pre-
dominantly perceive government spending to be more or less sufficient already. The results of chap-
ter 4 have shown that people in the Western countries want more government spending as well,
mostly on social areas. But they do not seem to feel this need so urgently that majorities would want
an increase in spending without having an idea who might pay for it.
We have clearly registered some imbalances in attitudes when it comes to social spending and taxa-
tion: a not insignificant number of citizens seem to want increased public spending, but they are not
prepared to pay for it through increased taxation. The frequency of this attitudinal inconsistency
varies quite extensively across countries, but it seems to be more common in poorer countries than
in the rich Western countries.
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6 Political Efficacy and Political Participation
Political participation can imply a great variety of participatory activities, from political discussion
to campaign participation. The basic form of participation, however, is simply casting one’s vote at
general elections. Since in democracies the legitimacy of a government depends on elections depict-
ing the people’s choice, an effective democracy itself depends on the willingness of its citizens to
vote. But an election does not guarantee that the elected leaders in the end come up to their voters’
expectations. Furthermore, one might ask whether it is rational behaviour to vote, since one single
vote matters little in relation to the general turnout (Downs, 1957: 260f.). However, if everyone de-
cides against voting, acting up to the belief that it will not change anything, the legitimacy of a gov-
ernment declines.
A good premise for any citizen’s political participation is a sense of political efficacy. The items that
are used to tap into the concept of political efficacy in the Role of Government surveys can be as-
signed to two dimensions, called internal and external efficacy. Closely related to external efficacy
is the trust that citizens have (or do not have) in public officials. Therefore, the question battery also
comprises two items on incumbent-based trust. Internal efficacy describes the degree to which re-
spondents deem themselves capable of understanding politics and handling its complexities. This is
an important factor for political participation in at least two ways: First, well-informed and self-
confident citizens are usually taken to be a normative precondition for democracy – if citizens did
not trust their own judgment of politics, how could elections be expected to produce outcomes that
benefit the democratic majority, and eventually, how could democracy be seen as the ideal form to
regulate power in a society? Second, internal efficacy speaks on the individual motivation for politi-
cal participation. Citizens who believe that politics is beyond their judgment would be unlikely to
support the political system, and they would probably hardly be willing to cast a vote for some goal
or programme which they do not understand. External efficacy points to the belief that the political
system is at all responsive to the opinions and actions of its citizens. Only then can citizens expect
that their participation in politics is likely to change things, and only then it is reasonable to even
attempt to make one’s opinion heard. Finally, one important aspect that contributes to a systems’ re-
sponsiveness is the trustworthiness and integrity of its public officials – even citizens who believe in
their own ability to transfer their political opinion into a political mandate for the administration
may eventually be disappointed by a lack of responsiveness in that final stage of the political pro-
cess.
26
The first step will now be to describe and compare the national outcomes for the dimensions of po-
litical efficacy. While all ISSP member countries have democratic regimes nowadays, there is con-
siderable diversity in the historical trajectories they have taken towards democracy. For example,
the demise of the ‘iron curtain’ has initiated a sudden wave of democratisation in the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, who had formerly seen long decades of autocratic one-party regimes. That experi-
ence may still be engrained in the attitudes and perceptions of a society’s members, even after some
twenty years have passed. But where comparisons across time are possible, it can be expected that
we see marked shifts or trends in the efficacy beliefs of these countries, with different national con-
ditions determining where these trends have arrived at the time of the more recent surveys. In con-
trast, long-established democracies like Great Britain, the United States, or the Scandinavian coun-
tries would seem much less prone to sudden shifts in their levels of political efficacy. After that, we
will take a look at how these attitudinal dimensions affect participation at the polls across the ISSP
member countries.
26 For the definitions of the different concepts see Balch, 1974 and Craig, 1990.
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The investigation of trends is, however, somewhat hampered by the sparse availability of data. None
of the questions on political efficacy were asked in sufficiently similar form in all four modules of
the Role of Government surveys. Most of the analyses will therefore focus on the data of 1996 and
2006.
27
To cover at least the 1990, 1996, and 2006 surveys, we fall back on an item that is closely re-
lated to internal efficacy. This is the personal interest in politics:
How interested would you say you personally are in politics? (ZA4747:V60)
 Very interested
 Fairly interested
 Somewhat interested
 Not very interested
 Not at all interested
 Can’t choose
The general interest in politics differs somewhat among the ISSP countries and within the countries
between the module years of 1990, 1996, and 2006. The highest and most stable interest can be ob-
served in Australia. But also other countries from the Anglo-American context, the USA, Canada
and New Zealand, and some Western European countries, such as the Netherlands, France, Den-
mark, and Norway, as well as Venezuela and Israel’s Jews show a rather high political interest with
around 40% or more of the respondents answering to be very or fairly interested in politics. The
least general interest in politics is found in Taiwan, with only 6% of respondents in the same answer
categories. In South Korea, Russia, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, Croatia and Chile the interest
is, at between 10% and 20%, also rather low. One pattern that can in fact be observed is that political
interest is generally quite low in the former socialist states. However, a general trend over time to-
wards more or less general political interest cannot be observed, neither for all countries nor for re-
gional or political sub-groups.
A battery of questions addressing political efficacy directly was asked in 1996 and 2006:
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (ZA4747:V61-V66)
A. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does
B. The average citizen has considerable influence on politics
C. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our
country
D. I think most of the people are better informed about politics and government than I am
E. People we elect as members of the parliament try to keep the promises they have made
during the election
F. Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country
Respondents had the possibility to answer: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, dis-
agree, strongly disagree or can’t choose.
27 ISSP 1985 did in fact ask for political efficacy with question wordings very similar to those of ISSP 1996
and 2006. However, the response scale format in ISSP 1985 is so different that the data cannot be made
comparable.
Items A and B of this item battery ask for external political efficacy, that is the respondents’ belief in
the effect of their own political participation on the government’s actions. For item A, “People like
me don’t have any say about what the government does”, high percentages on the “agree” and
“strongly agree” categories indicate a low level of external efficacy. Item B, however, is phrased in
the opposite direction. Therefore, people who agree to “The average citizen has considerable influ-
ence on politics” show well developed external efficacy. In most countries, the responses to these
items are consistent to each other. Venezuela in 2006, for example, shows a high level of external
political efficacy on both items, with 72% of respondents (strongly) agreeing that the average citi-
zen has considerable influence in politics and only 24% (strongly) agreeing to the statement that
“people like me” have no say about what the government does. In the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovenia and East Germany we see a mirrored picture for both module years: while large groups of
respondents (between 70% and 80%) do not think to have a say about what the government does,
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Figure 6.1 Respondents who say that they are very/fairly interested in politics (in %)
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consistently only up to 10% of respondents think the average citizen actually has influence in poli-
tics. Thus, in these countries we can speak of a low level of external efficacy.
In Taiwan, South Africa, and also France, however, the outcomes do not match so coherently. In Tai-
wan and South Africa, there are high levels of respondents agreeing to both of the opposed ques-
tions, while in France, respondents tend to disagree with both statements.
Looking at changes over time, the data display a striking increase of the sentiment not to have a say
on government actions for Latvia and Russia between 1996 and 2006. People in these two young
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Figure 6.2 Respondents who (strongly) agree that people like them have nothing to say about what
the government does (in %)
democracies obviously felt much more confidence in their ability to influence their government in
1996 than they did in 2006. The positively worded item B reflects the same finding of decreasing ex-
ternal efficacy for Latvia; in Russia, the level of agreement to that item was already so low in 1996
that there was hardly any space left for a further decrease in 2006. In Latvia, this happened on the
background of a dense series of re-formations of the governing party coalitions; in Russia, the back-
ground might be (then) President Putin’s growing dominance in Russian politics.
Items C and D were constructed to measure internal efficacy more directly than the question on po-
litical interest which was presented above. Again, the two related items are phrased in opposite di-
rections. Responses on the two “agree”-categories of item C – understanding of politics – represent a
high level of internal efficacy, while responses on the same categories of item D – personal level of
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Figure 6.3 Respondents who (strongly) agree that the average citizen has influence in politics (in %)
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information, compared to others – indicate a low level of internal efficacy. Respondents in Austra-
lia, Canada, and Denmark have a very positive self-perception of their understanding of political is-
sues in both available module years. Coherently, in these countries the relative personal informa-
tion-level is also perceived as rather high. Latvia, Russia, and Hungary are again some examples of
low efficacy, now on the internal side. But in contrast to the case of external efficacy, Latvia and
Russia display no relevant change over time. It seems plausible that the low internal efficacy ob-
served here is partly a result of the non-democratic past of these countries, while the slump in exter-
nal efficacy may be related to the national political conditions at the time of the 2006 survey, when
any ‘honeymoon’ phase of the new democracies certainly was over.
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Figure 6.4 Respondents who (strongly) agree to they have a good understanding of political issues
(in %)
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Figure 6.5 Respondents who (strongly) agree that most people are better informed about politics and
government than they are (in %)
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The concept behind items E: are members of parliament trying to keep their promises? and F: can
civil servants be trusted to do what is best for the country? can be called incumbent-based trust.
Both items are phrased in the same direction; the higher the response rates on the “agree”-catego-
ries, the higher the level of incumbent-based trust. A first observation to be made is that the trust in-
vested into incumbents is somewhat lower than feelings of external efficacy among the respon-
dents. Most respondents, across most countries, seem to distinguish between the responsiveness of
the democratic system as such, which they perhaps implicitly refer to when responding to the ques-
tions on external efficacy, and the responsiveness of the persons who actually run the administra-
tion. If this is true, the actual personnel of administrations would seem to be unable to claim the
credit that is assigned to the democratic system as such, for which they purport to act.
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Figure 6.6 Respondents who (strongly) agree that MPs try to keep their promises (in %)
The highest levels of trust in members of the parliament and civil servants can be observed in Den-
mark, Switzerland, Ireland, and interestingly, South Africa, as the only non-Western country,
which, in addition, has seen political turmoil in its very recent history. In the Philippines there is a
comparatively high level of trust towards members of the parliament, but not for civil servants.
However, this observation can only be made in 1996. Towards 2006, trust in both respects has de-
creased substantially. Again, there is a likely explanation in the national political conditions. In
2005 and 2006, the Philippines have been subject to events which have likely undermined the legiti-
macy of the elected administration – among these ethnically and ideologically motivated guerrilla
warfare, an alleged attempt of a coup d’état, and a short period of martial law, which according to
international NGOs, marked the beginning of a phase of deteriorating civil rights (Amnesty Interna-
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Figure 6.7 Respondents who (strongly) agree that civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for
the country (in %)
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tional, 2006). Especially low trust in members of the parliament can also be observed among the
Jewish population in Israel, where some political key figures had been connected to different scan-
dals, and a political debate about Israel’s warfare in Lebanon raged. The lowest levels of trust in both
respects and both module years can be observed in Japan, Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland,
Croatia and Italy. Notwithstanding some exceptions, the trust expressed in members of the parlia-
ment is even a little lower than trust in civil servants.
Some more elaborate analyses for the data of 2006 reveal that in many countries, the external effi-
cacy-dimension cannot be measured as distinctively as the dimensions on internal efficacy and in-
cumbent-based trust.
28
Therefore we will now concentrate on the two stronger dimensions to look at
the correlations between political efficacy and actual electoral participation in 2006. All ISSP mod-
ules contain information on the respondents’ participation in the most recent election as a back-
ground variable. For internal efficacy and incumbent-based trust, we computed simple indices as
the means of the three, respectively two, variables measuring each concept. The indices therefore
vary between 1 and 5. 1 means that the respondent perceives him/herself as very interested, having
a good understanding, and a high level of information on politics, respectively has strong trust in
members of the parliament and civil servants, whereas 5 indicates low levels of interest, understand-
ing, information, and trust.
The following table shows the levels of self-reported electoral participation for all countries, and it
reports the association of electoral participation with the two efficacy-related indices for the re-
spondents of each country. As one would expect, in all countries there is a majority of respondents
who said that they cast their vote in the last general election. Sometimes this is a vast majority, up to
nearly universal participation (e.g. Australia and Denmark), sometimes only around 50% of all re-
spondents report having cast a vote (e.g. Switzerland and Slovenia). Apart from the motivational
factors on the citizen level, such as internal efficacy (and some others, for example the subjective as-
sessment of the importance of a given election), there are relevant factors on the societal level, too.
One is the existence of national laws which make citizens obliged to go to the polls. Such laws are
formally in place in Australia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, France, The Netherlands, The Philip-
pines, Spain, some provinces of Switzerland, and Uruguay. But only Australia and Uruguay enforce
compliance with that law to some degree.
29
Denmark, on the other hand, achieves a similar reported
electoral participation of around 90% without such laws. However, compulsory voting laws are only
an expression of the fact that voting is regarded as a good citizen’s duty in most, if not all, societies.
A well-known consequence is that survey results usually show much higher participation rates than
those which can actually be observed at the polls. In other words, survey respondents tend to over-
state their compliance with the social norm of participation.
The two right-most columns of the table show correlation coefficients of electoral participation and
the efficacy and trust indices. These coefficients can assume any value between ‘-1’ (for a negative
association, saying that high efficacy/trust goes with low participation), over ‘0’ (for no association
at all), to ‘1’ (for a positive association, saying that high efficacy/trust goes with high participa-
tion).
30
The results show substantially higher positive correlations between internal efficacy and
28 A so-called ‘principal component analysis’ shows all three of the dimensions named above only in 7 out of
35 country samples. In the remaining 28 out of 35 national samples, only the dimensions for “internal effi-
cacy” and “incumbent-based trust” are clearly depicted. On the basis of this analysis, we decided to ex-
clude the sample for the Arab population of Israel in the remainder of this chapter, and also to leave out the
results for internal efficacy correlations of Russia and the Philippines.
29 For further information on compulsory voting see: International IDEA, 2001.
30 Such correlation coefficients are not the methodologically most elaborate tool to assess the degree of asso-
ciation for the present data, but they yield good indicative results for our purpose.
participation than between incumbent-based trust and participation, although even the coefficients
for efficacy are only low to modest. In 30 out of 31 country samples there is a significant correlation
for the first combination, with the highest coefficients in Switzerland and the USA. It might be these
well established democracies with relatively low voting turnout where the individual motivation
plays a real role in the decision to (not) cast a vote. In terms of incumbent-based trust and political
participation, only in Finland and Ireland do we actually see a substantial correlation. In all other
countries, the results are not significant or do not reach a value of 0.1.
So, compared to the personal motivation to vote, the trust in the elected politicians and civil ser-
vants seems less crucial in the decision to vote. A possible interpretation could be that engaged citi-
zens do, in fact, vote also to support the democratic system, and even a lack of trust in the incum-
bents does not deter them from doing so.
Table 6.1 Self-reported electoral participation (ISSP background variable: VOTE_LE) and its correla-
tions with internal efficacy and incumbent-based trust, Pearson correlation reported
Country Self-reported
Electoral
Participation
31 32
Correlation internal
efficacy / Elect. Part.
Percent
Correlation incumbent-based
trust / Elect. Part.
Australia
33
Yes
No
Total
92.2
5,8
98.0
.102** .005
Canada Yes
No
Total
81.6
16.3
97.9
.214** -.032
Chile
34
Yes
No
Total
64.8
4.6
69.4
35
.029 .019
Croatia Yes
No
Total
74.8
22.8
97.7
.102** .025
Czech Republic Yes
No
Total
65.6
30.9
96.5
.243** .053
Denmark Yes
No
Total
92.5
6.9
99.5
.096** .010
Dominican Republic
36
Yes
No
Total
71.1
28.5
99.6
.103** .005
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31 The information on electoral participation is not available for Great Britain in 2006.
32 See the list which election is addressed by this question in the different countries in 2006 in Appendix A.I.
33 Compulsory voting law: Strict enforcement.
34 Compulsory voting law: Weak enforcement.
35 For Chile, respondents not registered to vote were not asked this question. Such persons would usually be
counted as non-voters, but here they are simply not included, along with persons not responding for dif-
ferent reasons.
36 Compulsory voting law: Not enforced.
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Country Self-reported
Electoral
Participation
Correlation internal
efficacy / Elect. Part.
Percent
Correlation incumbent-based
trust / Elect. Part.
Finland Yes
No
Total
74.3
14.7
89.0
.232** .142**
France
37
Yes
No
Total
81.6
15.4
97.1
.076** .073**
Germany-West Yes
No
Total
80.1
11.2
91.3
.211** .047
Germany-East Yes
No
Total
81.0
16.0
97.0
.186** .082
Hungary Yes
No
Total
76.4
22.7
99.1
.229** -.007
Ireland Yes
No
Total
71.1
28.4
99.4
.254** .119**
Israel-Jews Yes
No
Total
75.4
22.7
98.2
.147** .057
Japan Yes
No
Total
75.5
19.9
95.5
.165** .055
Latvia Yes
No
Total
50.2
28.7
79.0
.166** .079*
Netherlands
38
Yes
No
Total
64.3
30.4
94.7
.197** .087**
New Zealand Yes
No
Total
72.9
4.3
77.2
.141** .021
Norway Yes
No
Total
84.4
9.5
94.0
.112** .062*
Philippines
39
Yes
No
Total
76.6
22.4
99.1
x .005
Poland Yes
No
Total
65.4
30.6
96.1
.199** .067*
37 Compulsory voting law: Information on enforcement not available.
38 Compulsory voting law: Not enforced.
39 Compulsory voting law: Not enforced.
Country Self-reported
Electoral
Participation
Correlation internal
efficacy / Elect. Part.
Percent
Correlation incumbent-based
trust / Elect. Part.
Portugal Yes
No
Total
71.9
26.8
98.7
.111** .028
Russia Yes
No
Total
64.4
35.6
100.0
x -.048*
Slovenia Yes
No
Total
50.6
20.4
71.1
.248** .089*
South Africa Yes
No
Total
67.1
26.8
94.0
.068** .061**
South Korea Yes
No
Total
65.9
32.7
98.6
.119** .071**
Spain Yes
No
Total
60.2
23.2
83.5
.187** .029
Sweden Yes
No
Total
82.9
15.7
98.6
.135** .078**
Switzerland
40
Yes
No
Total
49.6
35.2
84.8
.369** .024
Taiwan Yes
No
Total
70.4
17.0
87.5
.123** .035
United States Yes
No
Total
66.0
32.9
98.9
.354** -.045
Uruguay
41
Yes
No
Total
89.7
9.8
99.5
.097** -.081**
Venezuela Yes
No
Total
78.0
18.5
96.6
.216** .006
The category “Total” reports the summed percentage of all valid responses, the percentage missing to yield
100% is comprised of different forms of non-response, and in some cases, of respondents not eligible to
vote. These cannot be distinguished in the present data.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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40 Compulsory voting law: Only in one province (Canton Schaffhausen).
41 Compulsory voting law: Strict enforcement.

7 Corruption
The phenomenon of “corruption” is as old as political systems are. A definition is not easy, because
corruption can appear in different modalities in all areas of society. Joseph Senturia described it
broadly as “the misuse of public power for private profit” (Senturia, 1931: 448). Corruption has in-
creasingly attracted the attention of the media as well as of social and political research during the
last two decades. A high degree of corruption is destructive not only because it may disturb the citi-
zenry’s confidence in politics and bureaucracy, but also because corruption causes financial losses
for the state and the society. Beyond this, corrupt civil servants will slow down bureaucratic work-
ing processes to underline the “necessity” of bribes for speeding up again, which often also hamper
economic activities. With respect to administration’s interactions with individual citizens, corrup-
tion causes inequality and, therefore, discontent.
The ISSP addressed the topic of corruption in 2006 for the first time. Therefore, there is no trend data
available yet, and we are confined to looking at the cross-country comparison. Respondents have
been asked about their perceptions of corruption among politicians and civil servants as well as
about their trust in public officials and their direct experience with bribery. Once again, we have to
keep in mind that social survey data by their very nature always reflect two components: one com-
ponent is the reality which respondents are asked to reflect in their responses, the other component
is the subjectivity in perception and evaluation which the respondents necessarily bring in. What is
perceived as acceptable tipping in one country may be viewed as bribery in another. The ISSP items
have tried to avoid at least the evaluative input, by asking respondents very specifically about their
factual beliefs. We will later briefly check how well this has worked by comparing selected ISSP
items with a measure of corruption derived from expert judgements.
The first two questions asked on corruption in the ISSP 2006 deal with people’s trust in public offi-
cials:
In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like you? (ZA4700: V58)
 Almost always
 Often
 Occasionally
 Seldom
 Almost never
 Can’t choose
Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Country] depends on who they
know? (ZA4700: V59)
 Definitely does
 Probably does
 Probably does not
 Definitely does not
 Can’t choose
In the great majority of ISSP member countries, majorities of respondents answer that public offi-
cials almost always or often deal fairly with “people like them”. The exceptions here are the Domini-
can Republic, Japan, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and the Arab population of Israel, where
majorities of respondents consider themselves being treated fairly only seldom or even almost
never. The one Western country where almost one third of all respondents answered that way is the
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USA. The example of the USA makes it very clear that the issue of fairness can also be an issue of
discrimination: The group of US respondents who do not feel treated fairly is composed to a strik-
ingly high share of “non-whites”. There are significantly more African Americans, Hispanics and
people of other origins (47%)
42
in this group than those who refer to themselves as “White” (27%)
(table not shown).
To the question whether people think that the treatment people get from public officials depends on
who they know, great majorities in almost all countries answered that this is definitely or probably
the case in their country. Matching the results of the previous variable, responses to these answer
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Figure 7.1 Respondents (2006) who answered: Public officials deal fairly with people like me; Almost
always/Often, Occasionally, Seldom/Almost never (in %)
42 The composition of the overall sample is 28.5% respondents from other origin and 71.5%
“Whites”.
categories are at 86% extremely high in the Dominican Republic. In the USA, however, the results
show, with 88% agreeing to the non-trusting categories, an even less optimistic picture. The out-
comes for Japan also stand out, seen in international comparison. While Japan can be found among
those countries where the belief in fair treatment turns out to be rather weak, the Japanese are, tak-
ing into account the general pessimistic feelings in all countries, at 56% still among those countries
where mistrust in respect to the relevance of connections is not overwhelming.
Especially characteristic are the results for the Scandinavian countries. Denmark is the only country
with a majority of respondents answering that treatment by public officials does definitely or prob-
ably not depend on connections and only 38% saying it does. Finland is, with 51% of respondents
on the non-trusting answer categories, the second most optimistic country among the ISSP mem-
bers. Also, their neighbour Norway belongs, with 63% of respondents to these answer categories on
Attitudes towards the Role of Government 95
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 %
Australia
Canada
Chile
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Finland
France
Germany-West
Germany-East
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland
Israel-Jews
Israel-Arabs
Japan
Latvia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Definitely/Probably does Definitely/Probably does not
Figure 7.2 Respondents (2006) who answered: Treatment by officials depends on contacts; Defi-
nitely/Probably does, Definitely/Probably does not (in %)
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international comparison, still among the most trusting countries. The striking exception in this
pattern is Sweden, where 85% of respondents think that fair treatment depends on connections, fall-
ing behind the USA, the Dominican Republic and Chile among those ISSP countries where trust in
public officials is least developed.
The next two questions ask for the respondent’s perception of corruption among politicians and
civil servants:
In your opinion, about how many politicians in [Country] are involved in corruption? (ZA4700:
V60)
And in your opinion, about how many public officials in [Country] are involved in corruption?
(ZA4700: V61)
 Almost none
 A few
 Some
 Quite a lot
 Almost all
 Can’t choose
It is no surprise that these questions highly correlate with the questions on incumbent based trust
(see chapter 6), asking for citizens’ trust towards elected members of the parliament and towards
civil servants to do what is best for the country. We have seen there that trust is generally not
strongly developed. Therefore it is only consistent that the questions on civil servants being in-
volved in corruption show very similar distrustful perceptions. In many countries majorities of re-
spondents believe that politicians, as well as public officials, are involved in corruption, although
there is usually more trust in public officials than in politicians. The greatest shares of respondents
answering quite a lot or almost all politicians, respectively, public officials are involved in corrup-
tion can be observed in Israel, where 80% of respondents in both sub-samples express their mistrust
in politicians and more than 60% of the Jewish population and more than 70% of the Arab popula-
tion mistrust in public officials. But also in Croatia, South Korea, Venezuela, and the Dominican Re-
public, mistrust is high. The lack of trust of can usually be traced back to publicly known problems
or scandals which often affect even the highest positions in the state. Taking Israel – the country
with the most extreme levels of mistrust – as an example, it is easy to name a series of scandals in
which prominent members of the cabinet, up to the later Prime Minister and the President, were in-
volved.
43
We dare to speculate that it is the combination of such scandals with a well functioning
press which rises public awareness to the exceptional levels seen in Israel (see also the results for the
last item below).
As was the case for the two previous questions, low levels of mistrust in public servants are to be ob-
served in the Scandinavian countries. The lowest shares of respondents answering quite a lot or al-
most all politicians or public officials are involved in corruption can, again, be found in Denmark
with only 3% of respondents for both items. The outcomes for Finland and Norway are also very
low, by international comparison. Although Sweden again shows the highest levels of mistrust
among the Scandinavian countries, in international comparison the Swedes perceive their public
43 A brief check of international press sources brought up investigations against Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu in the late 1990s, against Secretary of the State Ariel Sharon with the
charge of illegal campaign contributions in 2002, against then Trade Minister, later resigned
Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert in 2003 to 2005. Rumours of corruption of President Katzav, who
recently resigned under several charges, had also been known for a long time. All these publicly
debated events will have left their marks on citizens’ attitudes.
servants as not very corrupt, which is in contrast to the question on connections being helpful.
Alongside the Scandinavian countries, the perception of corruption is rather low also in Switzer-
land, Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. As a side note, we observe that in those countries
where people generally trust their politicians and public officials more, there tends to be less mis-
trust in politicians than in public officials. This is a reversion of the dominant pattern of countries
with higher levels of mistrust, where public servants seem somewhat more trustworthy than politi-
cians.
Attitudes towards the Role of Government 97
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 %
Australia
Canada
Chile
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Finland
France
Germany-West
Germany-East
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland
Israel-Jews
Israel-Arabs
Japan
Latvia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Politicians Public officials
Figure 7.3 Respondents (2006) who answered: Quite a lot/ Almost all Politicians/ Public officials are
involved in corruption (in %)
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The last question concentrates on the respondents’ degree of personal exposure to bribery:
In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family come across a
public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favour in return for a service?
(ZA4700: V62)
 Never
 Seldom
 Occasionally
 Quite often
 Very often
 Can’t choose
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Figure 7.4 Respondents (2006) who answered: Public official wanted bribe; Never/Seldom, Occasion-
ally, Quite/Very often (in %)
Looking at the outcomes of this item, one might suspect an influence of social desirability on the re-
sponse behaviour. If a public official wanted a bribe, it is at least imaginable that he or she actually
received it from the respondent or the family member. Since offering bribes is almost as morally
condemnable and criminal as accepting bribes, some respondents might not have answered this
question absolutely truthfully. Nevertheless, the outcomes are plausible. Matching the results of the
previous items, the lowest exposure to bribery is reported in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the
Scandinavian countries. Also in Australia, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, less
than 1% of respondents report bribing experiences. In other countries, such as Russia, South Africa,
the Philippines, Croatia, Latvia, Chile, and the Czech Republic, there is a much higher number of
people who experienced bribery demands from public officials. The extreme case in this respect is
Venezuela with 71% of respondents claiming to have quite or very often have come across public of-
ficials who wanted a bribe in return for a service. We take care to note that Israel does have a some-
what above average level of bribery experiences, but is by far not as extreme as with regard to per-
ceived corruption of politicians and officials, which we take as indication that it might be the visi-
bility of scandals and of the involved persons which contributes to the latter.
To get an idea of how well the ISSP items mirror other, more comprehensive, measurements of cor-
ruption, we finally compare the ISSP outcomes with the outcomes of the Corruption Perceptions In-
dex (CPI) of 2006. The CPI was developed in 1995 by the non-government organisation Transpar-
ency International as an internationally comparable measure of corruption. The aim of this index is
to give an impression of the actual level of corruption in different countries; still, the CPI is also us-
ing survey data of a special kind, since objective sources for such information are understandably
rare. The CPI is a composite index, making use of surveys conducted by different independent re-
search institutes, using different samples and different methodology
44
(Lambsdorff, 1999, 2006).
The main difference between the CPI and the ISSP data is that the CPI data is based on expert judge-
ments provided by business people and staff of think tanks, while the respondents of the ISSP sur-
vey are sampled to (ideally) represent the whole population of their respective countries. The ISSP
responses, therefore, can claim much less professional expertise than the CPI responses. But perhaps
they reflect the situation in their respective countries based on a more immediate experience, and in
a broader sense. There is no way of proving that one these approaches better mirrors the ‘true’ situa-
tion in a country than the other. However, we can check to which extent their results coincide. The
more they do, the more confidence can we have in both, independent, ways of assessing corruption.
For this comparison, we created a very simple index with those two ISSP variables that ask directly
for the respondents’ perception of corruption among politicians and civil servants. Our index varies
between 1 “almost no perceived corruption among politicians and civil servants” and 5 “almost all
politicians and civil servants perceived to be involved in corruption”. The scores of the CPI, however,
range in the opposite direction from 10 “free of corruption” to 0 “profound corruption”. Since the in-
dex values cannot be compared directly, we will only look at the relative ranks of countries that re-
sult from the values of each index. The table below shows the results of both indices compared to
each other for all ISSP countries that participated in the Role of Government survey in 2006.
Attitudes towards the Role of Government 99
44 The CPI 2006 includes data from the following sources: CPIA, the Country Policy and Institutional Assess-
ment by the IDA and IBRD (World Bank), 2005 EIU, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006. FH, Freedom
House Nations in Transit, 2006. IMD, the International Institute for Management Development, Lausanne.
MIG, Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the Merchant International Group, 2006. PERC, the Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong. UNECA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Afri-
can Governance Report 2005. WEF, the World Economic Forum. WMRC, the World Markets Research Cen-
tre, 2006.
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Table 7.1 Comparison: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Index based on ISSP variables V60, V61
for those countries participating in ISSP 2006
CPI ranges from 10 ‘Least possible corruption’ to 0 ‘High corruption’, ISSP index ranges from
1 ‘Almost none involved in corruption’ to 5 ‘Almost all’.
CPI Rank
45
Country CPI Score ISSP Rank Country ISSP Score
1 Finland 9.6 1 Denmark 1.830
1 New Zealand 9.6 2 New Zealand 2.446
2 Denmark 9.5 3 Switzerland 2.478
3 Sweden 9.2 4 Finland 2.498
4 Switzerland 9.1 5 Norway 2.541
5 Norway 8.8 6 Australia 2.697
6 Australia 8.7 7 Netherlands 2.738
6 Netherlands 8.7 8 Sweden 2.758
7 Great Britain 8.6 9 Ireland 2.841
8 Canada 8.5 10 Great Britain 2.892
9 Germany 8.0 11 Canada 2.957
10 Japan 7.6 12 Germany 2.976
11 France 7.4 13 Japan 3.153
11 Ireland 7.4 14 United States 3.174
12 Chile 7.3 15 Uruguay 3.204
12 United States 7.3 16 Taiwan 3.208
13 Spain 6.8 17 France 3.303
14 Portugal 6.6 18 Chile 3.356
15 Slovenia 6.4 19 Spain 3.437
15 Uruguay 6.4 20 Czech Republic 3.444
16 Israel 5.9 21 Slovenia 3.455
16 Taiwan 5.9 22 Hungary 3.511
17 Hungary 5.2 23 South Korea 3.580
18 South Korea 5.1 24 Venezuela 3.581
19 Czech Republic 4.8 25 Portugal 3.586
20 Latvia 4.7 26 Poland 3.596
21 South Africa 4.6 27 South Africa 3.608
22 Poland 3.7 28 Latvia 3.766
23 Croatia 3.4 29 Dominican Republic 3.817
24 Dominican Republic 2.8 30 Croatia 3.848
25 Philippines 2.5 31 Philippines 3.888
25 Russia 2.5 32 Israel 3.890
26 Venezuela 2.3 33 Russia 4.101
45 Countries holding the same CPI value have the same rank.
The two measurement tools of corruption, one based on expert interviews, the other on probability
samples, reveal astonishingly similar results. Both indices confirm that more advanced countries
tend to have lower levels of perceived corruption than less advanced countries. The data also con-
firms the results of all ISSP variables on corruption in terms that for both indices in Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland the lowest levels of perceived corruption prevail. While
the CPI rank of Sweden appears in line with its Scandinavian neighbours, showing very low levels
of corruption, in the ISSP Sweden ranks somewhat lower. Also, in Israel corruption levels are some-
what higher per ISSP data than per CPI, while, on the other hand, Venezuela ranks better in the ISSP
index.
46
Apart from that, the differences in the outcomes are quite marginal.
In summary, the outcomes of the ISSP questions on corruption show the same general pattern that
the CPI reveals: by and large, poor countries tend to have a higher perceived level of corruption than
wealthier countries. If we take that to reflect true levels of corruption – now with some more confi-
dence –, researchers can use the ISSP data to explore the reasons and consequences of that pattern.
Looking at institutions and policies, the negative correlation of wealth and corruption may well be
based on reciprocal causation: in poor countries civil servants sometimes earn so little money that
their sustenance may depend on receiving bribes, which thus becomes common practice in their
countries. But this practice, at the same time, is probably one of the reasons why institutions of all
kinds remain inefficient and, therefore, the economy in such countries fails to produce more wealth
(Nield, 2002). To follow up on such considerations, researchers will have to combine ISSP Role of
Government results with more detailed contextual information on the relevant countries.
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46 Had we also used the item on bribery experience in the ISSP index, Venezuela might have
moved down considerably in ISSP ranks. We abstained from doing so to maintain the extreme
simplicity of the index.
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Appendix
A.I Fieldwork Dates and Elections Reference
Country Time of Field Work Question Date of Election
Australia July, 11 –
October, 16 2007
Did you vote in the Federal Election
held on October, 9 2004?
October, 9 2004
Canada March, 3 –
October, 31 2006
Did you vote in the last federal
election?
January, 23 2006
Chile June, 24 –
July, 13 2006
Did you vote on the last parliamentary
elections of December 2005?
December, 11 2005
Croatia October, 1 –
November, 30 2006
Did you vote in last general election? January, 16 2005
Czech Republic October, 19 –
November, 27 2006
Let’s go back to the last elections to the
Chamber of Deputies that were held on
2 and 3 July, 2006. Did you take part in
the elections?
June, 2/3 2006
Denmark January, 30 –
May, 5 2008
Did you vote in the previous election
the 8 February 2005, or were there some
reason that you didn’t have opportunity
to or desire to vote?
February, 8 2005
Dominican
Republic
November, 16 –
December, 4 2006
Did you vote in the last presidential
elections in 2004?
May, 16 2004
Finland September, 20 –
November, 24 2006
Did you vote in the last parliamentary
elections in 2003? Please circle the most
appropriate answer.
March, 16 2003
France September –
December 2006
Did you vote in last first round of the
2002’s French presidential election?
April, 21 2002
Germany March, 18 –
August, 21 2006
The last general election took place on
September, 18 2005.
Were you eligible to vote in that
election?
September, 18 2005
Great Britain June –
November 2006
Variable not available.
Hungary January, 5 –
January, 23 2006
Question text not available. April, 9 2005
Ireland October 2005 –
February 2006
Did you vote in the last general
election?
May, 17 2002
Israel March, 15 –
August, 15 2005
Did you vote last election? January, 28 2003
Japan November, 18 –
November, 26 2006
Did you vote in the House of
Representatives’ election in September
last year?
September, 11 2005
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Country Time of Field Work Question Date of Election
Latvia May, 29 –
June, 19 2007
Did you vote in the 9th Parliament
elections on the 7th of October 2006?
October, 7 2006
Netherlands March –
December 2006
For which party did you vote at the
Local Council elections of March 7
2006?
March, 7 2006
New Zealand August, 10 –
October, 10 2007
At the 2005 General Election, who did
you vote for?
September, 17 2005
Norway September, 20 –
November, 17 2006
Did you vote in the national election
this year?
September, 11/12
2005
Philippines March, 8 –
March, 14 2006
Did you vote in the May 10, 2004
election or not?
May, 10 2004
Portugal October, 9 2006 –
February, 19 2007
Did you vote in the last elections? February, 10 2005
Russia January, 3 –
January, 22 2007
Question text not available. December, 7 2003
Slovenia October –
November 2006
It has past two years since last
parliamentary elections. Did you vote?
October, 3 2004
South Africa August, 22 –
October, 10 2006
For which party did you vote for in the
last election, which was held in 2004?
April, 14 2004
South Korea June, 25 –
August, 31 2006
Did you vote in the last local
government elections?
May, 31 2006
Spain January, 15 –
March, 15 2007
Could you tell me which party or
coalition did you vote for in the general
elections of March 2004?
March, 14 2004
Sweden February 7 –
April 28, 2006
Did you vote in the latest general
elections?
September, 15 2002
Switzerland February, 8 –
August, 14 2007
For which party did you vote at the last
federal elections in October 2003?
October, 19 2003
Taiwan July, 16 –
September 18, 2006
Did you vote in the last legislator
election?
December, 11 2004
United States March, 7 –
August, 7 2006
In 2000, you remember that Gore ran
for President on the Democratic ticket
against Bush for the Republicans. Do
you remember for sure whether or not
you voted in that election?
November, 7 2000
Uruguay November, 6 –
December, 23 2006
Did you vote in the last National
Elections in 2004?
October, 31 2004
Venezuela November, 13 –
December, 15 2006
Question text not available. December, 3 2006
A.II Correspondence List of Cumulated Variables and Replications
Cumulated dataset
ZA4747
Role of Government Other modules
Variable
Number
Variable Label 1985 1990 1996 2006
V8 Obey laws without exception V6 V4 V4 V4 Social
Inequality
1987: V6
Good
citizens:
always obey
laws
V9 Public protest meetings V7 V5 V5 V5
V10 Protest publications V8 V6
V11 Protest demonstrations V9 V7 V6 V6
V12 Occupation gov. office V10 V8
V13 Damage gov. buildings V11 V9
V14 National anti-government
strike
V12 V10 V7 V7
V15 Revolutionaries: hold public
meetings
V13 V11 V12 V8 Social
Inequality
1987: V15
Allow public
meetings
-overthrow
government
V16 Revolutionaries: publish books V15 V12 V13 V19
V17 Racist: public meetings V16 V13 Citizenship
2004: V16
V18 Racist: publish books V18 V14
V19 Known criminal: police tail V19 V15
V20 Known criminal: tap phone V20 V16
V21 Known criminal: open mail V21 V17
V22 Known criminal: police detain V22 V18
V23 Worse type of justice error V27 V19 V14 V10
V24 Computer threat privacy V28 V15
V25 How much income tax rich V29 V23 Social
Inequality
1987: V58
1992: V66
Tax rates:
high-low
income
V26 Gov.: redistribute wealth V30 V24 V16 Social
Inequality
1999: V57
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Cumulated dataset
ZA4747
Role of Government Other modules
Variable
Number
Variable Label 1985 1990 1996 2006
V27 Gov.: control wages by law V74 V25 V17
V28 Gov.: control prices by law V75 V26 V18
V29 Gov. and economy: cuts in
gov. spending
V76 V27 V19 V11
V30 Gov. and econ.: Financing
projects for new jobs
V77 V28 V20 V12
V31 Gov. and econ.: Less gov. reg.
of business
V78 V29 V21 V13
V32 Gov. and econ.: Support
industry to develop new
products
V79 V30 V22 V14
V33 Gov. and econ.: Sup. declining
industries to protect jobs
V80 V31 V23 V15
V34 Gov. and econ.: Red. working
week for more jobs
V81 V32 V24 V16
V35 Gov. should spend money:
environment
V82 V33 V25 V17
V36 Gov. should spend money:
health
V83 V34 V26 V18
V37 Gov. should spend money: law
enforcement
V84 V35 V27 V19
V38 Gov. should spend money:
education
V85 V36 V28 V20
V39 Gov. should spend money:
defense
V86 V37 V29 V21
V40 Gov. should spend money:
retirement
V87 V38 V30 V22
V41 Gov. should spend money:
unemployment benefits
V88 V39 V31 V23
V42 Gov. should spend money:
culture and arts
V89 V40 V32 V34
V43 Gov: keep down inflation V92 V41
V44 Power of trade unions V93 V42 V33
V45 Power of business and industry V94 V43 V34
V46 Power of government V95 V44 V35
V47 Gov. role: electric power V96 V46
V48 Gov. role: steel industry V98 V47
V49 Gov. role: banking, insurance V99 V48
Cumulated dataset
ZA4747
Role of Government Other modules
Variable
Number
Variable Label 1985 1990 1996 2006
V50 Gov. responsibility: provide
job for everyone
V101 V49 V36 V25 Social
Inequality
1987: V51
1992: V59
Work
orienta-
tions
1989: V44
Religion
1991: V5
1998: V5
V51 Gov. responsib.: control prices V102 V50 V37 V26
V52 Gov. responsib.: provide health
care for sick
V103 V51 V38 V27
V53 Gov. responsib.: provide living
standard for the old
V104 V52 V39 V28 Social
Networks
2001: V56
V54 Gov. responsib.: help industry
grow
V105 V53 V40 V29
V55 Gov. responsib.: provide living
standard for unemployed
V106 V54 V41 V30 Social
Inequality
1987: V53
1992: V61
Work
orienta-
tions
1989: V45
Gov.:
Unemploy
ment pay
V56 Gov. responsib.: reduce income
differences between rich and
poor
V107 V55 V42 V31 Social
Inequality
1987: V49
1992: V57
Environ-
ment
1993: V6
2004: V5
Religion
1991: V6
1998: V6
V57 Gov. responsib.: financial help
to students
Q17:
loans
or
grants
V56 V43 V32 Social
Inequality
1987: V50
1992: V58
Gov.: more
poor children
to university
V58 Gov. responsib.: provide
decent housing
V57 V44 V33
V59 Gov. responsib.: laws to
protect environ.
V45 V34
V60 How much interested in
politics
V58 V46 V44 Citizenship
2004: V42
V61 People like me have no say
about what gov. does
V47 V45 Citizenship
2004: V36
Social
Networks
2001: V64
V62 Average citizen: influence in
politics
V48 V46
V63 Good understanding of
political issues
V50 V47 Citizenship
2004: V38
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Cumulated dataset
ZA4747
Role of Government Other modules
Variable
Number
Variable Label 1985 1990 1996 2006
V64 Most people better informed
than I am
V52 V48 Citizenship
2004: V39
V65 MPs try to keep promises V53 V49
V66 Trust in civil servants V54 V50 Citizenship
2004: V43
Religion
1991 and
1998:
optional
part
V67 Taxes for high incomes V57 V51 Social
Inequality
1987: V55
1992: V63
Religion
1991 and
1998:
optional
part
V68 Taxes for middle incomes V58 V52 Social
Inequality
1987: V56
1992: V64
Social
Inequality
V69 Taxes for low incomes V59 V53 Social
Inequality
1987: V57
1992: V65
Social
Inequality
Background Variables
Cumulated dataset Role of Government
Variable
Number
Variable Label 1985 1990 1996 2006
SEX R: Sex V118 V59 V200 SEX
AGE R: Age V117 V60 V201 AGE
MARITAL R: Marital status V120 V61 V202 MARITAL
COHAB R: Steady life-partner V62 V203 COHAB
EDUCYRS R: Education I: years of schooling V122 V80 V204 EDUCYRS
DEGREE R: Education II: highest education level V123 V81 V205 DEGREE
WRKST R: Current employment status V109 V63 V206 WRKST
WRKHRS R: Hours worked weekly V108 V64 V215 WRKHRS
ISCO88 R: Occupation 1988 ISCO/ILO
occupation code
V208 ISCO88
WRKSUP R: Supervises others at work V113 V74 V216 WRKSUP
WRKTYPE R: Working for private, public sector,
self-employed
V114 V71 V212 WRKTYPE
SELFEMP R: Self-employed V112 V72 V213
NEMPLOY R: Self-employed - number of
employees
V73 V214 NEMPLOY
UNION R: Trade union membership V116 V77 V222 UNION
SPWRKST S-P: Current employment status V135 V94 V207 SPWRKST
SPISCO88 SP: Occupation 1988 ISCO/ILO
occupation code
V210 SPISCO88
HOMPOP How many persons in household V121 V98 V273 HOMPOP
HHCYCLE Household composition: children+adults V121 V142 V274 HHCYCLE
PARTY_LR R: Party affiliation: left-right (derived) V130 V82 V224-V247 PARTY_LR
VOTE_LE R: Vote last election: yes, no V139 V85 V249-V271 VOTE_LE
ATTEND R: Attendance of religious services V133 V89 V220 ATTEND
RELIGGRP R: Religious main groups (derived) V132 V88 V219 RELIGGRP
CLASS R: Subjective social class V134 V90 V221
nat_REG Region V115 V103 V300-V323 nat_REG
WEIGHT Weighting factor V141 V114 V325 WEIGHT
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A.III Guide for the ISSP Role of Government Cumulation of the Years
1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 (ZA4747 and ZA4748)
This guideline is intended to give an overview on the contents, the structure and basic coding rules
of the ISSP “Role of Government I-IV” cumulation. Further, variable-related information is avail-
able through the study documentation on ZACAT
1
.
The data release consists of two separate data files. The main file, ZA4747 “ISSP Cumulation ROG”,
contains only cumulated variables. That means it includes:
 all topic-related variables of the master questionnaires, so called module variables, which appear
in at least two Role of Government modules and
 most of the so called background variables, mostly covering demographics, which appear in at
least two Role of Government modules collected by
 all those ISSP member countries that participated in at least two Role of Government modules
(22 countries).
However, there are other, mainly national-specific background variables, which belong to the cur-
rent ISSP standard, but cannot be cumulated for various reasons. Although not being comparative
over time, these variables might still be useful for many analyses. Therefore they are integrated in a
second data file with the study number ZA4748 “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On”. ZA4748 is a sepa-
rate data file going along with separate documentation on ZACAT. The contained variables, how-
ever, can be matched easily to the cumulated file if necessary.
The cumulation and its “Add On” file are based on the data of the integrated data files of the modules
ZA1490 (1985), ZA1950 (1990), ZA2900 (1996) and ZA4700 (2006). It does not go back to the indi-
vidual country files of each module. A general rule is that the cumulated data follow the coding of
the 2006 module as closely as possible, because this module represents the current ISSP standard. In
terms of the background variables that means that whenever the module data allows it, the coding of
the “The ISSP Background Variable Standard” set in 2001
2
, is realized, again, as closely as possible.
1 Countries
Over the four years the Role of Government surveys have been conducted, the following countries
participated:
1985 1990 1996 2006
Australia X X X X
Canada X X
Czech
Republic
X X
Germany X X X X
France X X
Great Britain X X X X
Hungary X X X
Ireland X X X
Israel X X X
Italy X X X
Japan X X
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data with a focus on international comparative studies and election studies.
2 http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/dienstleistung/daten/umfragedaten/issp/members/codinginfo/
bv2001_20060425.pdf
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1985 1990 1996 2006
Latvia X X
New Zealand X X
Norway X X X
Philippines X X
Poland X X
Russia X X
Slovenia X X
Spain X X
Sweden X X
Switzerland X X
USA X X X X
For Germany (except for 1985) as well as for Israel (except for 1990) there are two subsamples avail-
able in the data for each year. In case of Germany one sample contains the West German respon-
dents and the other one the East German respondents. Since 1990 the ISSP has been administered in
both parts of the country. Since East Germany is oversampled in every integrated data file, it is
strongly recommended to use the correcting weighting factor, if Germany as a whole country is
analysed. In case of Israel, two subsamples can be distinguished by districts. In 1990 only Jewish
dominated districts were covered. Whereas in 1996 and 2006 sampling was extended to cover Arab
dominated districts as well. Only for 1996 the resulting “Arab” subsample constitutes a dispropor-
tional oversample. Therefore, as for Germany, the cumulated data file offers a weighting factor for
Israel to correct this disproportion.
2 Variables
Both data files contain a number of administrative variables:
The “Study number” (V1) and the “Edition of the data file” (V2) exactly indicate the data file at hand.
The respondent’s ID-numbers (V3) are those of the integrated data files and have not been changed
for better comparability of the cumulated with the integrated data of each individual module (ex-
ception: Australia, 1985, needed serial numbering). However, the ID numbers are only unique
within its respective country and year of the module. To provide a unique identification across the
data files it is necessary to combine V3 and V7.
While V4 “Year” allows the splitting of the data by modules, variables V5 and V6 indicate the coun-
tries. The “Country” variable (V6) offers codes for the country as a whole, whereas the “Coun-
try_Sample” variable (V5) specifies also the subsamples within certain countries. As a “cumulation
specific” variable, V7 “Country_Year” combines the information of V6 and V4, prepared as a sup-
porting tool for analysis. According to the current ISSP standard, the codes for all three variables
which deal with country identification make use of international three-digit “ISO 3166 Codes”.
To match both datasets it is necessary to use the “ID” variable V3 as well as the “Country_Year” vari-
able V7 as key variables.
Example for SPSS:
SORT CASES by V3 V7. /** use this on BOTH input files.
MATCH FILES
/FILE=’put path of your data file here\ZA4747.sav’
/FILE=’put path of your data file here\ZA4748.sav’
/BY V3 V7.
EXECUTE.
2.1 Variables of the cumulated data file ZA4747 “ISSP Cumulation ROG”
All module variables, which have been asked in at least two Role of Government modules, are in-
cluded in the cumulated data file ZA4747. For a detailed overview on these variables see the corre-
spondence list at section 6 of this document.
Besides the module variables, ZA4747 contains the following background variables:
SEX, AGE, MARITAL, COHAB, EDUCYRS, DEGREE, WRKST, WRKHRS, ISCO88, WRKSUP,
WRKTYPE, SELFEMP, NEMPLOY, UNION, SPWRKST, SPISCO88, HOMPOP, HHCYCLE, PARTY_LR,
VOTE_LE, ATTEND, RELIGGRP, CLASS, nat_REG and WEIGHT
The “Region” variable (nat_REG) is the only national-specific variable that can be cumulated over
time, because the administrative divisions of regions did not change too much over the years. Ac-
cording to the current ISSP standard it is split by country, but cumulated over the module years.
2.2 Variables of the supplementary data file ZA4748 “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On”
The “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On” data file ZA4748 contains all those background variables
which cannot be cumulated for various reasons. The national-specific variables are all split by
country as well as by module. A prefix of two ISO code letters indicates the country and a two-digit
suffix the module year.
 nat_DEGREE for the years 1985, 1990 and 2006
The national-specific DEGREE variables for 1996 do not appear in the data file, because in
1996 the countries were supposed to hand in a standardized DEGREE variable, which is
not national-specific at all. For DEGREE 1996 see the cumulated variable in the cumu-
lated data file.
 nat_PRTY for the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006
 nat_VOTE_LE for the years 1985, 1990 and 1996
This variable, asking for the party respondents voted for in the last election, does not exist
as a background variable in the ISSP anymore after 1997 and therefore is not available in
the data of 2006.
 nat_SIZE for the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006
 National occupation variables (nat_OCC and nat_SPOCC) mainly for the years 1985 and
1990, when the ISCO scheme had not been established as a standard yet, and 1996 for all
those countries that did not hand in either ISCO68 or ISCO88
 Respondent’s income and Family income for the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006
(nat_RINCOME and nat_INCOME)
The income variables have been brought to the current ISSP standard. That means that for
the earlier modules, original enumerated value codes for income categories are recoded
into the midpoints of the classes for which they stand. These variables could now techni-
cally be cumulated. We decided against doing so, because in some countries variables
have been surveyed quite differently. Information varies widely, for example, whether the
survey asked for income per month or year, before or after tax and in what currency. Last
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but not least, it is hardly useful to cumulate income data in a range of twenty years,
without accounting for inflation.
 nat_ETHN for the years 1990, 1996 and 2006
In addition to those national-specific variables, there are some variables that are not to be cumu-
lated, because there is too much coding variation. These variables are available as well in the
“ZA4748” file:
 WRKTYPE_85, URBRURAL_85, URBRURAL_90, URBRURAL_96, URBRURAL_06
As in the integrated data, URBRURAL_85 and _90 remain unlabeled, because the information asked
for within these variables differs too much across the countries. The country-specific labels, how-
ever, are available through the documentation on ZACAT.
Other variables appear in their current form the first time in 2006 and therefore can not be cumu-
lated:
 IL_REG_06, TOPBOT_06, MODE_06
3 Missing Values
The Role of Government cumulation introduces three codes for missing values which do not appear
in the integrated data files in this form. These codes specify certain missing cases in the cumulation
explicitly:
-1 ‘Variable not available for this country in this module’
This missing value is coded in the event that a country did not provide the variable in question.
-2 ‘Country specific variable not applicable for this country’
This missing value is coded for national-specific variables, indicating the cases of the other coun-
tries.
-3 ‘Variable not available in this module’
This missing value is cumulation-specific and is coded in the case of variables that are not part of a
certain module at all. It is also coded, however, in the event that a variable cannot be cumulated and
is therefore not available for this module in the cumulation file, but does appear in the “ZA4748”
additional data file.
For reasons of consistency all missing values are coded into the negative range. So, those values
which appear in the integrated data files as, for example, “8 Can’t choose” and “9 No answer” appear
in the cumulated file as “-8 Can’t choose” and “-9 No answer”.
4 ISCO88/SPISCO88
ISCO88 and SPISCO88 appear in the cumulated data file only for the years 1996 and 2006, since the
mostly national-specific occupation codes and ISCO68 3-digit codes, which are available for 1985
and 1990, cannot be cumulated. All variables are available, however, in the additional data file
“ZA4748”. To increase comparability, the ISCO68 variables of the integrated data file, handed in by
some countries in 1996, have been recoded into the ISCO88 standard by a recoding scheme devel-
oped by Harry Ganzeboom
3
.
3 Ganzeboom’s Tools for deriving status measures on http://home.fsw.vu.nl/hbg.ganzeboom/ pisa/in-
dex.htm.
Occupation codes: (In 2006 all countries prepared ISCO88 (4-digit) occupation codes.)
ISCO 1985 1990 1996
Australia Australian Standard
Classification of
Occupations (ASCO)
Australian Standard
Classification of
Occupations (ASCO)
ISCO88 (4-digit)
Great Britain OPCS 1980 occupation
groups
OPCS 1980 occupation
groups
Standard Occupational
Classification
(SOC) 1991
Hungary - ISCO68 (4-digit) ISCO88 (4-digit)
Ireland - IRL: Irish List of
Occupations
ISCO88 (4-digit)
Israel - unspecified 1-digit code ISCO68 (4-digit)
Italy unspecified 2-digit code unspecified 2-digit code unspecified 2-digit code
Norway - ISCO68 (3-digit)
4
ISCO68 (4-digit)
USA 1970 Census of
Population
1970 Census of Population ISCO68 (4-digit)
West Germany ISCO68 (3-digit) ISCO68 (3-digit) ISCO88 (4-digit)
East Germany - ISCO68 (3-digit) ISCO88 (4-digit)
Canada - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Czech - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Philippines - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Slovenia - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Sweden - - Nordic Standard Classification
of Occupation (NSCO)
New Zealand - - ISCO 88 (4-digit)
France - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
5
Japan - - -
Latvia - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Poland - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Russia - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
Spain - - ISCO68 (4-digit)
Switzerland - - ISCO88 (4-digit)
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4 Norway also prepared a national-specific variable, containing the data coded to the “Nordic Standard
Classification of Occupations“(NSCO). This variable is available in ZA1950 (1990).
5 France also prepared a national-specific variable, containing the data coded to the “French Standard Clas-
sification of Occupations“(PCS). This variable is available in ZA2900 (1996).

A.IV Basic Questionnaire
ISSP 2006 - Role of Government
Attitudes towards the Role of Government 121
2006 ISSP MODULE ON 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
DRAFTING GROUP
Great Britain 
(Alison Park, convenor) 
Brazil
Czech Republic 
Poland
Sweden 
Taiwan
122 GESIS-Arbeitsbericht Nr. 7
2006 Role of Government questionnaire
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE
June 2005 
General notes to members 
1. All notes which are not part of the questionnaire and intended only for members (for example, 
translation notes) are enclosed in pointed, angle brackets <like these>. 
2. All the elements in questions which require local adaptation are enclosed in square brackets. These 
instructions often relate to adding the name of the relevant country. For example, in Britain “Generally, 
how would you describe taxes in [Country] today?” would read “Generally, how would you describe taxes 
in Britain today?” 
3. All the elements in questions which are optional are enclosed in double round brackets ((like these)). 
4. Q-numbers in parentheses – for example (Q1 1996): question numbers in 1996 questionnaire. For 
countries who participated in 1996, please use the same wording for these questions as you did then. 
(N) = new in 2006. 
5. Translation and clarification notes are provided after the relevant question. 
6. In general, if  translators have difficulty when translating answer codes, they should focus upon 
translating the concepts expressed by the codes rather than the precise words used.  
7. In 1996 no general translation note was provided as to what we meant by ‘government’. Unless there 
are very strong reasons not to, countries who participated in 1996 should use the same wording for 
‘government’ as they did then. In general, by government we mean the central regime within a country 
(that is, any government that has been elected into power). In some countries the meaning of questions 
which refer to ‘government’ can be improved by adding ‘of any party’ after ‘government’ (to stress that it 
does not necessarily have to be the current government).  
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(Q1 1996) 
 1. In general, would you say that people should obey the law 
  without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on 
  which people should follow their consciences even if  it 
  means breaking the law?   (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY)) Obey the law without exception  
    OR                                                  
   Follow conscience on occasions     
   Can't choose    
  (Q2 1996) 
 2. There are many ways people or organisations can  
  protest against a government action they strongly oppose.   
  Please show which you think should be allowed and which  
  should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. 
  Should it be allowed? 
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX 
ON EACH LINE))   Probably Definitely Can't 
   Definitely Probably not not choose
 a. Organising public meetings to protest  
  against the government         
 b. Organising protest marches and  
  demonstrations         
 c. Organising a nationwide strike of all  
  workers against the government         
<Precode: the word ‘allowed’ has the same meaning as the word ‘permitted’. The main issue is whether 
people should be free or have the right to show to varying degrees their discontent with a government.> 
<In Q2a, a ‘public meeting’ refers to an assembly or gathering which everyone is allowed to attend. In 
the context of this particular question, the purpose of the meeting should be clear.> 
(Q5 1996) 
 3. There are some people whose views are considered extreme  
  by the majority.  Consider people who want to overthrow  
  the government by revolution.  Do you think such people  
  should be allowed to ... 
     Probably Definitely Can't
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE)) Definitely Probably not not choose
 a. ... hold public meetings to express their views?    
 b. ... publish books expressing their views?    
<In Q3b, ‘publish books’ can be translated as ‘have their books published’.> 
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(Q6 1996) 
 4. All systems of justice make mistakes, but which  
  do you think is worse ...   (9)
   
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY)) ... to convict an innocent person,  
    OR                                                  
   to let a guilty person go free?  
  Can't choose     
(Q9c-h 1996) 
 5. Here are some things the government might do for the 
  economy.  Please show which actions you are in 
  favour of and which you are against. 
     Neither
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Strongly in In in favour of  Strongly Can’t
 ON EACH LINE)) favour of favour of nor against Against against choose
 a. Cuts in government spending     
 b. Government financing of projects 
  to create new jobs     
 c. Less government regulation of 
  business     
 d. Support for industry to develop 
  new products and technology     
 e. Support for declining industries  
  to protect jobs     
 f. Reducing the working week to  
  create more jobs     
<5d refers to funding (financial aid) from government.> 
<5e refers not only to direct financial aid from government (government subsidies) but could also include, 
for example, import restrictions imposed by government.> 
<In 5f ‘reducing the working week’ refers to shortening the number of hours that employees are required 
to work in a week.> 
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(Q10a-h 1996) 
 6. Listed below are various areas of government spending. 
  Please show whether you would like to see more or less
  government spending in each area. 
  Remember that if you say "much more", it might require  
  a tax increase to pay for it. 
     Spend
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Spend Spend the same Spend Spend Can't
ON EACH LINE)) much more more as now less much less
choose
 a. The environment           
 b. Health           
 c. The police and law enforcement           
 d. Education           
 e. The military and defence           
 f. Old age pensions           
 g. Unemployment benefits      
 h. Culture and the arts           
<6g refers to unemployment benefits. If there are no such benefits within a country (this applied to the 
Philippines in 1996), the question should not be asked.> 
(Q12a-j 1996) 
 7. On the whole, do you think it should or should not 
  be the government's responsibility to ... 
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX   Probably Definitely 
ON EACH LINE)) Definitely Probably should should Can't 
   should be should be not be not be choose 
 a. ... provide a job for everyone 
  who wants one    
 b. ... keep prices under control    
 c. ... provide health care for the sick    
 d. ... provide a decent standard of 
  living for the old    
 e. ... provide industry with the help 
  it needs to grow    
 f. ... provide a decent standard of 
  living for the unemployed    
 g. ... reduce income differences between 
  the rich and the poor    
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 h. ... give financial help to university 
  students from low-income families    
 i. ... provide decent housing for those 
  who can't afford it    
 j. ... impose strict laws to make industry  
  do less damage to the environment    
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (8) 
(N) 
 8. How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following 
areas?
   Very Quite Neither Quite Very Can’t 
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Successful successful successful un- un- Choose 
ON EACH LINE))   nor successful successful 
    unsuccessful 
 a.  Providing health care for the sick?      
   
b.  Providing a decent standard of  
   living for the old?      
 c.  Dealing with threats to [Country’s]  
   security?      
 d.  Controlling crime?      
          
 e.  Fighting unemployment?      
 f.  Protecting the environment?      
<In 8c, by ‘threats to [Country’s] security’ we mean security threats from within or outside the country in 
question. These threats might be posed by terrorist organisations, or organised crime (but only where 
this threatens national security) or by other countries. >  
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(N)  
 9. Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen.  Do you think the 
authorities should have the right to… 
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX   Probably Definitely 
ON EACH LINE)) Definitely Probably should should Can't 
   should should not have not have choose 
   have right have right right right  
a. ... detain people for as long as they want  
without putting them on trial?     
 b. ... tap people’s telephone conversations?      
 c. ... stop and search people in the street  
  at random?    1056
<Question text: by ‘terrorist act’ we mean an action organised by a group that uses terror or violence as 
a weapon to achieve its aims. By ‘authorities’ we mean that group of public officials who are primarily 
involved in law enforcement.> 
(Q13 1996) 
  ((Now some questions about politics.)) 
 10. How interested would you say you personally are in politics? 
   (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))
   Very interested  
   Fairly interested  
   Somewhat interested  
   Not very interested  
   Not at all interested  
   Can't choose     
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(Q14a-b, d, f-h) 
 11. Please tick one box on each line to show how much  
  you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
    
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX   Neither 
ON EACH LINE)) Strongly  agree nor  Strongly Can't 
   agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree choose 
 a. People like me don't have any say  
  about what the government does    
 b. The average citizen has considerable  
  influence on politics    
 c. I feel that I have a pretty good  
  understanding of the important  
  political issues facing our country    
 d. I think most people are better informed 
  about politics and government than I am    
 e. People we elect as MPs try to keep  
  the promises they have made during  
  the election    
 f. Most civil servants can be trusted  
  to do what is best for the country    
<In 11c, by ‘pretty good’ we mean “rather good” and not the negative reading “quite good”.> 
<If 11d, ‘politics’ should be understood as a general term to cover the political system, political affairs 
and political events and procedures.> 
<In 11e, ‘MPs’ (Members of Parliament) are people elected for national parliament. 
<In 11f, ‘civil servants’ are higher level non-political government paid officials. They are not elected to 
office – they applied for their posts and are senior public servants or government administrators.>
(Q17a-c 1996) 
 12a. Generally, how would you describe taxes in [Country] today? 
  ((We mean all taxes together, including [wage deductions],  
  [income tax], [taxes on goods and services] and all the rest.)) 
  First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ...  
    (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))     
   ... much too high,  
   too high,  
   about right,  
   too low,  
   or, are they much too low?  
   Can't choose     
 
      
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
      
      
Attitudes towards the Role of Government 129
 b. Next, for those with middle incomes, are taxes ... 
    (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))     
   ... much too high,  
   too high,  
   about right,  
   too low,  
   or, are they much too low?  
   Can't choose     
 c. Lastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes ... 
    (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))
   ... much too high,  
   too high,  
   about right,  
   too low,  
   or, are they much too low?  
   Can't choose     
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(N)
 13a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
  “There are only a few people I can trust completely” 
    (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY)) Strongly agree  2
   
   Agree   
   Neither agree nor disagree   
   Disagree   
   Strongly disagree   
   Can’t choose (  
        
 b) “If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you” 
    (9)
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY)) Strongly agree  2
   
   Agree   
   Neither agree nor disagree   
   Disagree   
   Strongly disagree   
   Can’t choose ( 
 
(N) 
 14a. Some people because of their job, position in the community or contacts, are asked  
  by others to help influence important decisions in their favour. What about you? How often are you 
asked to help influence important decisions in other people’s favour? 
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))  (9)   
   Never              
   Seldom  
   Occasionally  
   Often  
   
   Can’t choose 
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b. And are there people you could ask to help influence important decisions in your favour?  
   
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))  (9)
   No, nobody   
   Yes, a few people  
   Yes, some people  
   Yes, a lot of people  
   Can’t choose   
 
<Precode: if necessary, the difference between ‘a few’ and ‘some’ can be clarified by using a term such 
as ‘only a few’.> 
 
(N)
 15.  In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like you? 
  ((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))     (9)
 Almost always 
   Often  
   Occasionally  
   Seldom   
   Almost never  
   Can’t choose 
<Question text: by ‘public officials’ we mean both elected and non-elected public officials, and by ‘fairly’ 
we mean impartially, without any favouritism or prejudice. The phrase ‘people like you’ should be 
translated so as to refer to people with roughly similar characteristics to the respondent, but care should 
be taken not to use an expression that might offend.> 
 
(N) 
 16. Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Country] depends  
  on who they know? 
    (9)
((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY)) Definitely does  2
   
   Probably does   
   Probably does not   
   Definitely does not   
   Can’t choose (  
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 17. In your opinion, about how many politicians in [Country] are involved in corruption? 
((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))  (9)
   Almost none   
   A few  
   Some  
   Quite a lot  
   Almost all  
   Can’t choose 
 
<Precode: if necessary, the difference between ‘a few’ and ‘some’ can be clarified by using a term such 
as ‘only a few’.> 
 18. And in your opinion, about how many public officials in [Country] are involved in corruption? 
((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))  (9)
   Almost none   
   A few  
   Some  
   Quite a lot  
   Almost all  
   Can’t choose 
<Precode: if necessary, the difference between ‘a few’ and ‘some’ can be clarified by using a term such 
as ‘only a few’.> 
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 19. In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family come across a 
public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favour in return for a service? 
((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))  (9)   
   Never              
   Seldom  
   Occasionally  
   Quite often  
   
   Very often 
   Can’t choose 
(N) 
 20. On average, about how many people do you have contact with in a typical week day, including 
people you live with. 
  We are interested in contact on a one-to-one basis, including everyone with whom you  
  chat, talk, or discuss matters. This can be face-to-face, by telephone, by mail,  
  or on the internet. Please include only people you know. 
Please select one from the following categories that best matches your estimate. 
   
((PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY))  (9)
 0-4 persons    
   5-9  
   10-19  
   20-49  
   50 or more  
    Can’t choose     
   
<This final question is a compulsory background variable. It must be asked, but its position in the 
questionnaire is not fixed and can be decided by each ISSP country.> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

A.V ZACAT
ZACAT is an online data portal which allows searching for, browsing, analysing and downloading
social science survey data, including all ISSP modules. The data which can be accessed is a selection
of the complete data available at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.
ZACAT uses NESSTAR © technology and offers all the services of that technical platform to its users:
Apart from a direct download of datasets, it offers detailed documentation on study as well as vari-
able level and provides a direct access to further studies’ background material. Furthermore, it is
possible to search for keywords that are either contained in the questions and answers of the ques-
tionnaires or in the variable or value labels of the datasets. This search is not limited to only one de-
fined data file, but covers all survey data retrievable at ZACAT. Besides, ZACAT enables the user to
execute first analyses on a limited basis, as for example frequencies distribution, cross tabulations
and regressions. It is also possible to generate diverse charts for these analyses, such as pie or bar
charts. A few examples are depicted below. Detailed usage instructions are online available via the
ZACAT page and the NESSTAR help system.
The use of ZACAT and the data download is free of charge. For the analysis and download of data, a
registration is required. However, the only prerequisite is that the usage of the data is for scientific
purposes; therefore a short description of the project is requested.
URL: http://zacat.gesis.org
Examples for analyses on ZACAT
(1) Frequencies: Obey the law without exception or follow the conscience on occasions
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(2) Split file: Attitudes of respondents towards protest demonstrations, listed by countries and
years (data is weighted)
(3) Cumulated bar chart: Association between voting participation and interest in politics in
Switzerland
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A.VI ISSP Modules
Year Module
1985 Role of Government I
1986 Social Networks I
1987 Social Inequality I
1988 Family and Changing Gender Roles I
1989 Work Orientations I
1990 Role of Government II
1991 Religion I
1992 Social Inequality II
1993 Environment I
1994 Family and Changing Gender Roles II
1995 National Identity I
1996 Role of Government III
1997 Work Orientations II
1998 Religion II
1999 Social Inequality III
2000 Environment II
2001 Social Networks II
2002 Family and Changing Gender Roles III
2003 National Identity II
2004 Citizenship I
2005 Work Orientations III
2006 Role of Government IV
2007 Leisure and Sports
2008 Religion III
2009 Social Inequality IV
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A.VII ISSP Members and Participation
Country Year ´85 ´86 ´87 ´88 ´89 ´90 ´91 ´92 ´93 ´94 ´95 ´96 ´97 ´98 ´99 ´00 ´01 ´02 ´03 ´04 ´05 ´06
Australia
Austria
Germany
Great Britain
United States
Italy
Hungary
Netherlands
Ireland
Israel
Norway
Philippines
New Zealand
Russia
Bulgaria
Canada
Czech Republic
Japan
Poland
Slovenia
Sweden
Spain
Cyprus
France
Portugal
Slovakia
Bangladesh
Chile
Latvia
Denmark
Brazil
Switzerland
Venezuela
Finland
Flanders
Mexico
South Africa
Taiwan
South Korea
Uruguay
Croatia
Dominican Republic
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